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EU Competition policy and regional State aid 
Preface 
This paper reviews the prospects for competition policy control of regional aid post 2013. 
The report was prepared by the European Policies Research Centre (EPRC) under the aegis 
of EoRPA (European Regional Policy Research Consortium), a grouping of government 
authorities from across Europe. The Consortium provides sponsorship for EPRC to undertake 
monitoring and analysis of the regional policies of European countries and the inter-
relationships with EU Cohesion and Competition policies. Over the past year, EoRPA 
members comprised the following partners: 
Austria 
 Bundeskanzleramt (Federal Chancellery), Vienna 
 
Finland 
 Työ- ja elinkeinoministeriö (Ministry of Employment and Economy), Helsinki 
 
France 
 Délégation à l'aménagement du territoire et à l'attractivité régionale (DATAR), Paris 
 
Germany 
 Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Technologie (Federal Ministry for the 
Economy and Technology), Berlin 
 Ministerium für Wirtschaft, Energie, Bauen, Wohnen und Verkehr des Landes 
Nordrhein-Westfalen (Ministry for the Economy, Energy, Construction, Housing and 
Transport of the Land of Nordrhein-Westfalen), Düsseldorf 
 
Italy 
 Ministero dello Sviluppo Economico (Ministry of Economic Development), 
Dipartimento per lo sviluppo e la coesione economica (Department for Development 
and Economic Cohesion), Rome 
 
Netherlands 
 Ministerie van Economische Zaken, Landbouw en Innovatie (Ministry of Economic 
Affairs, Agriculture and Innovation), The Hague 
 
Norway 
 Kommunal-Og Regionaldepartementet (Ministry of Local Government and Regional 
Development), Oslo 
 
Poland 
 Ministerstwo Rozwoju Regionalnego (Ministry of Regional Development), Warsaw 
 
Sweden 
 Näringsdepartementet (Ministry of Enterprise, Energy and Communications), 
Stockholm 
 
Switzerland 
 Staatssekretariat für Wirtschaft (SECO, State Secretariat for Economic Affairs), Bern 
United Kingdom 
 East Midlands Development Agency, on behalf of the English RDAs 
 Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, London 
 The Scottish Government, Enterprise, Transport and Lifelong Learning Department, 
Glasgow 
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It should be noted that the content and conclusions of this paper do not necessarily 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Recent developments in State aid control have been dominated by the response to the 
financial and economic crisis. However, in the last few months, consideration has been 
given to the reform of the regional aid guidelines (RAG) for the post 2013 period. The aim 
of this paper is to set the scene for the reform process, highlight national perspectives on 
the different dimensions of policy and consider the implications of recent economic data 
for issues of spatial coverage. 
The overall regulatory architecture for regional aid is essentially a risk-based approach: 
Member States may simply report aid measures that comply with the General Block 
Exemption Regulation (GBER); aid schemes that do not conform to the GBER must be 
notified and approved in advance on the basis of the RAG; and large amounts of aid to 
exceptionally large projects must be scrutinised by the Commission on a case-by-case basis. 
It is fair to say that there is general satisfaction with this overall architecture among the 
Member States. However, there are several inconsistencies between the GBER and the RAG 
and some of the provisions lack clarity. There is also general, but not universal, resistance 
to the idea of reinforcing the provisions on incentive effect. The rules on aid to large firms 
come in for particular criticism, though it is the substance of the rules (and lengthy 
processes) which are at issue, more than the principle of case-by-case scrutiny itself.  
The spatial coverage of regional aid after 2013 is a major unknown. In particular, it is 
uncertain what overall population ceiling will be set (other than that it will be below 50 
percent); it is not clear which regions will be ‘earmarked’ within that ceiling, and 
especially what account, if any, will be taken of transitional regions or the proposals for the 
reform of EU Cohesion policy. A number of scenarios and variants based on the current 
approach can be envisaged, but these have very different impacts between countries. 
Member States are generally opposed to further cutbacks in overall coverage, which are 
anyway not required to stay below a ceiling of 50 percent of EU27 population. However, 
there are divergent views on issues such as the definition of ‘a’ regions, the treatment of 
transitional regions and the need for a ‘safety net’ to ensure a minimum level of coverage 
for each Member State; this last point is likely to be key for some Member States which, on 
a simple rolling forward approach, might be set to have coverage halved a second time. 
The selection of eligible areas – and specifically the ‘c’ areas - is closely tied to the 
question of spatial coverage. Historically, Member States have had varying degrees of 
freedom in area designation within their allotted population quota – with considerably more 
room for manoeuvre in 2007-13 than in 2000-6, albeit with a smaller population quota. The 
overriding theme of national responses on this issue is the need for more flexibility, for 
smaller population blocks (perhaps a percentage of population rather than a minimum 
100,000) and for account to be take of territorial cohesion – through recognition of the 
special needs of islands, border areas and so on. A suggestion which merits further 
consideration is that of more extensive and distinct assisted area coverage for SME support.  
Aid forms and values have tended not to be among the most controversial aspects of 
regional aid control, and many aspects of the policy dimension are now settled. However, 
consideration of the details of the existing rules reveals scope for clarification and greater 
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consistency and coordination between the various relevant texts. Although in the past, 
rates of award have often been set by the Commission at levels higher than required by the 
Member States, there is now evidence that maximum rates do bite; moreover, there is 
considerable resistance to any further lowering of maximum rates, the argument being that 
this would further undermine incentive effect and increase windfall gains. A further 
important issue concerns the need to reconcile Cohesion policy enthusiasm for financial 
engineering instruments with competition policy constraints, in advance of the next 
planning period.  
Finally, early signs are that the approach to future reform of the regional aid guidelines is 
constructive rather than combative and that the outcome may involve more evolution than 
revolution. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Recent developments in State aid control have been dominated by the financial and 
economic crisis and, latterly, by exit strategies from the special measures introduced to 
deal with the fall-out from the crisis. In the course of the last few months, however, 
consideration has also been given to the revision of the regional aid guidelines for the post-
2013 period. The aim of this paper is to consider the issues raised by the European 
Commission and the Member States, particularly against the backdrop of regional economic 
change since the adoption of the current guidelines and in the context of the proposed 
Cohesion policy reforms for 2014-20. 
The review process for the regional aid guidelines began informally in autumn 2010 with DG 
COMP’s invitation to Member States to submit their observations on the operation of the 
guidelines in advance of a workshop scheduled for early 2011. In practice it seems that few, 
if any, Member States responded and the proposed workshop was eventually held in March 
2011. This was billed as an opportunity for the Member States to provide feedback to the 
Commission on their experience with the regional aid guidelines with a view to determining 
which elements are perceived to function well and what should be amended. This was 
structured around a number of key issues in particular, the definition of initial investment, 
the notion of incentive effect, the role of the ‘regional contribution’ in award decisions, aid 
ceilings, eligible expenditure, specific rules on aid to large projects, national maps and 
operating aid. Notably absent from the agenda was any discussion of overall assisted area 
coverage, and the definition of those areas at the EU level. This largely owed to the lack of 
statistics on which eligibility decisions will be based and uncertainty about proposals for 
Cohesion policy which were not due until summer 2011. 
In addition to verbal feedback at the workshop, most Member States undertook to provide 
written feedback in April 2011, though some, owing to internal consultation requirements 
at the subnational level, did not expect to be able to respond so promptly. For its part, DG 
COMP provided the following timetable for the review process: 
Regional aid guideline review timetable 
Launch of impact assessment       April 2011 
1st Multilateral meeting with Member States    October 2011 
2nd Multilateral with Member States      Q1 2012 
Impact Assessment final report      Q3 2012 
Adoption of new Regional Aid Guidelines    End 2012 
Notification of new maps and Commission decisions   During 2013 
Entry into force of new RAG      1 January 2014 
In practice, the written response from the Member States following the workshop has been 
rather partial. By August 2011, only around a third of Member States had responded, and in 
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many cases the responses are regarded as interim or confidential, or both. A further third 
expressed their intention not to respond at this juncture, but rather to await the 
Commission’s proposals. For the remainder, feedback was still under consideration. Within 
DG COMP, discussions on the reform of the Guidelines are ongoing and a public consultation 
on the guidelines is expected in autumn 2011 as part of the impact assessment. 
Against this background, the remainder of this paper assesses four key elements of regional 
aid control and explores the scope for reform after 2013. Accordingly, the paper is 
structured as follows. Section 2 looks at the overall architecture of regional aid control 
and the relationship between the different documents underpinning regional aid discipline. 
Section 3 provides a review and analysis of issues related to spatial coverage, drawing on 
latest statistical data and forecasts of regional economic trends. As just noted, this issue 
was absent from the March 2011 workshop agenda, but has the potential to be the most 
contentious element of the reform. Section 4 considers the rules governing the selection of 
eligible areas and the scope for flexibility in area designation. Section 4 reviews the rules 
governing aid forms and values. Last, Section 5 presents conclusions with some open issues 
in the reform debate.  
2. THE REGULATORY ARCHITECTURE FOR REGIONAL AID 
2.1 Background  
In recent years the Commission has increasingly pursued a two-pronged approach to 
regional aid discipline, in line with objectives set out in the State Aid Action Plan (SAAP).1 
On the one hand, it takes a more relaxed approach to schemes meeting clearly specified 
criteria; on the other, large individual aids and certain types of measure are subject to 
scrutiny. In consequence the responsibilities of the Member States in relation to 
transparency, monitoring and reporting have increased – in part shifting the burden of 
policing regional (and other) aid to the national level. 
The overall system for regulating the use of regional aid is summarised below. This 
illustrates the filtering and threshold approach which aims to target Commission resources 
on the scrutiny of those measures which it considers raise the most competition concerns.  
                                                 
1 European Commission (2005) State Aid Action Plan, COM(2005) 107 final, 7 June 2005. 
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Figure 2.1: The regulatory architecture for regional aid control 
 
  
The key elements of the system are threefold:  
 the exemption from notification and prior approval of certain aid schemes and 
supplementary ad hoc aid under the General Block Exemption Regulation (GBER) (or 
Regional BER); 
 the notification and prior approval of non-exempt schemes under RAG 2007-13 
 and the scrutiny of individual awards either because of their size or because they 
involve ad hoc aid which does not qualify for an exemption. 
In effect, the Commission’s approach is calibrated according to its perception of risk to 
competition. In the ‘low-risk’ category are measures which meet the tightly prescribed 
criteria of the GBER, with the qui pro quo that the burden of policing falls largely to the 
Member States. In the ‘medium-risk’ category are measures which lack the transparency for 
exemption or which involve the subsidisation of ongoing costs; these require case-by-case 
scrutiny of the scheme, but not, in general, of individual awards under approved schemes. 
In the ‘high-risk’ category, and meriting individual analysis at the level of the firm, are very 
large awards, even when offered under schemes that are either approved or exempted, 
together with ad hoc awards offered independently of any aid scheme. 
Notifiable aid under 
RAG 2007-13  
Operating aid 
Residual aid schemes (eg 
non-transparent aid) 
Very large individual cases 
Non-exempt ad hoc aid (eg 
not supplementary) 
[Aid to newly-created 
enterprises – pre GBER] 
Exempted aid under 
Regional BER / 
General BER 
Transparent aid schemes 
with incentive effect 
Supplementary ad hoc aid 
(50% max) 
Except very large 
individual cases 
Aid to newly-created 
enterprises (GBER only) 
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2.2 Regional aid under the Block Exemption Regulation 
In order to fall within the scope of the GBER,2 aid schemes must be ‘transparent’,3 must 
comply with the geographical coverage4 and aid ceilings5 of the approved regional aid map 
and aid must have ‘incentive effect’.6 In addition, eligible expenditure must meet certain 
criteria, notably that investment be retained in the recipient region for at least five years 
(three for SMEs).7 
In the context of the Regulation, transparency means regional investment aid schemes 
under which it is possible to calculate ex ante the gross grant equivalent (GGE) as a 
percentage of eligible expenditure. Such schemes include grants, interest rate subsidies 
and capped fiscal measures. Schemes which comprise a guarantee element may be 
considered transparent if the Commission has accepted the methodology used to calculate 
the aid intensity of the guarantee. Repayable advances are transparent if the total advance 
does not exceed the aid ceiling expressed as a percentage of eligible expenditure. The 
following are not considered transparent:8 aid comprised in capital injections (without 
prejudice to the specific provisions on risk capital); and aid comprised in risk capital 
measures (except for risk capital aid schemes for SMEs that comply with the BER). 
Regarding incentive effect, the GBER only exempts schemes from notification if, prior to 
work on the project starting, the beneficiary has submitted an application for aid. In the 
case of SMEs, fulfilment of this condition is sufficient to show incentive effect.9 In the case 
of large firms, Member States must in addition, and prior to granting aid, verify that the 
documentation provided by the beneficiary establishes the incentive effect of aid on the 
basis of one or more of the following criteria:  
i. a material increase in the size of the project/activity due to the aid;  
ii. a material increase in the scope of the project/activity due to the aid;  
iii. a material increase in the total amount spent by the beneficiary on the project/activity 
due to the aid;  
iv. a material increase in the speed of completion of the project/activity due to the aid; 
and/or  
                                                 
2 The Regional BER applied to schemes put into effect between 31 December 2006 and 31 December 
2008. The Regulation enabled schemes meeting certain criteria and whose legal basis cites the 
Regional BER to be exempted from prior notification and Commission approval. After 31 December 
2008, the Regional BER was repealed by the GBER, but schemes already introduced under the 
Regional BER were unaffected and may remain in place until 31 December 2013. The remainder of 
this section outlines the terms of the GBER, which came into force on 29 August 2008. 
3 GBER, Article 5(1). 
4 GBER, Article 13(2). 
5 GBER, Article 13(3). 
6 GBER, Article 8(1). 
7 GBER, Article 13(7). 
8 GBER, Article 5(2). 
9 GBER, Article 8(2). 
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v. that the project would not have been carried out as such in the assisted region 
concerned in the absence of aid.10  
These requirements do not apply to fiscal measures granted automatically without any 
discretion on the part of the awarding authorities and where the measure has been adopted 
prior to project start.11 
Ad hoc aid which is used to supplement aid granted on the basis of transparent regional aid 
schemes, and which does not exceed 50 percent of the total aid, is also exempt from 
notification provided that the ad hoc aid fulfils all the criteria of the Regulation.12 This 
provision enables, for example, a local authority to complement national level incentives 
(subject to the prevailing regional aid ceiling); however, it does not allow for the use of ad 
hoc aid independently, which must be notified and assessed on the basis of RAG 2007-13. 
The following categories are not exempted from notification under the GBER and must be 
approved by the Commission on a case-by-case basis prior to implementation:  
 Non-transparent regional aid schemes or those not meeting the criteria with 
respect to incentive effect. 
 Regional aid schemes targeted at specific sectors of economic activity within 
manufacturing or services (schemes targeting tourism are not considered specific). 
 Regional aid schemes which involve operating aid. 
 Regional aid for large projects on the basis of existing schemes where the amount 
of aid exceeds the notification threshold – i.e. the amount that a €100 million 
investment could receive. 
 Ad hoc aid, other than that which supplements exempted aid (as mentioned above). 
 Aid to firms which are subject to a recovery order following the award of illegal and 
incompatible aid. 
Member States must provide summary information on schemes they deem to be exempted 
from notification within 20 days of implementation.13 The full text of the aid scheme must 
be published and the direct internet address of the publication provided.14 Regional aids to 
large projects (those involving eligible expenditure exceeding €50 million) must be reported 
within 20 days of aid being granted.15 Records of aid awarded under exempted schemes 
must be maintained; these must be sufficiently detailed for the Commission to establish 
that the conditions of the Regulation have been complied with. These records must be 
maintained for 10 years from the date of any individual award or, in the case of aid 
                                                 
10 GBER, Article 8(3). 
11 GBER, Article 8(4). 
12 GBER, Article 2(5). 
13 GBER, Article 9(1). 
14 GBER, Article 9(2). 
15 GBER, Article 9(4). 
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schemes, from the date of the last award made under the scheme.16 Last, the GBER 
provides for the monitoring of the implementation of the terms of the Regulation.17 
2.3 Approval of schemes under the 2007-13 Regional aid guidelines 
The 2007-2013 Regional aid guidelines (RAG 2007-13) set out the circumstances in which the 
Commission will approve regional State aid that does not fall within the ambit of the block 
exemption. RAG 2007-13 deals with three categories of aid scheme: regional investment 
aid;18 operating aid;19 and aid for newly-created enterprises.20 Under the Regional BER, aid 
for newly-created enterprises was subject to authorisation under Article 107(3); however, 
the GBER brought this category within the scope of the exemption. The provisions for those 
categories of aid apply to all sectors apart from coal and fisheries, agricultural 
production,21 steel and synthetic fibres.22 In general, regional aid should be part of a 
multisectoral scheme which forms part of a regional development strategy with clearly 
defined objectives.23 
In practice, the vast majority of regional investment aid schemes fall within the scope of 
the GBER, not least since many of the assessment criteria (for example, compliance with 
the regional aid map and accompanying aid intensities, eligible expenditure and eligible 
investments) under RAG 2007-13 are identical to those under the GBER. The principal 
exceptions are regional investment aids that do not meet the transparency criteria in the 
GBER, together with individual cases; these are assessed in relation to the provisions of RAG 
2007-13 on a case-by-case basis. 
Operating aid, i.e. aimed at reducing a firm’s current expenses, is normally prohibited and 
cannot be exempted under the GBER; it is always subject to notification and Commission 
scrutiny. However, under RAG 2007-13, such aid may be granted in Article 87(3)(a) regions 
provided that it is justified in terms of its contribution to regional development, and 
provided that its level is proportional to the handicaps it seeks to alleviate. Member States 
are responsible for demonstrating the existence and scale of any such handicaps. In 
addition, certain specific forms of operating aid can be authorised in the low population 
density and least populated areas.24 Operating aid should in principle only be granted for a 
pre-defined set of eligible expenditures (such as replacement investment, transport or 
labour costs) and should be limited to a certain proportion of those costs.25 Operating aid 
intended to promote exports is excluded.26 
Aid for newly-created enterprises was expressly provided for under RAG 2007-13, but has 
since been subsumed within the GBER. This means that schemes targeting this group of 
                                                 
16 GBER, Article 10(2). 
17 GBER, Article 10(3). 
18 RAG 2007-13, paragraph 33-75. 
19 RAG 2007-13, paragraph 76-83. 
20 RAG 2007-13, paragraph 84-90. 
21 As specified in Annex I to the Treaty 
22 RAG 2007-13, paragraph 8. 
23 RAG 2007-13, paragraph 10. 
24 RAG 2007-13, paragraph 76. 
25 RAG 2007-13, paragraph 77. 
26 RAG 2007-13, paragraph 78. 
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firms, provided that they meet all the conditions of the GBER, may be exempted from 
notification and no longer fall to be assessed under the guidelines (unless, for example, 
they do not meet the transparency criteria of the GBER).  
2.4 Individual cases: very large awards and ad hoc cases 
At the ‘high-risk’ end of the spectrum in terms of competition effects, RAG 2007-13 sets 
lower rates of award to large investments and requires case-by-case prior approval by the 
Commission of awards to very large investment projects.  
The provisions on large investment projects reduce rates of award under existing regional 
aid schemes27 to projects with eligible investment of more than €50 million. This is 
achieved through a reduction scale (the larger the project, the lower the rate of award) 
incorporated into the regional aid schemes operated by the Member States, as set out in 
Figure 2.2.  
Figure 2.2: Rate reduction matrix for large investments 
Eligible expenditure Aid ceiling 
Up to € 50 million 100 % of regional aid ceiling 
For the part between € 50 and € 100 million 50 % of regional aid ceiling 
For the part exceeding € 100 million 34 % of regional aid ceiling 
 
As Figure 2.2 shows, projects involving investments of less than €50 million are unaffected 
by the matrix. However, for larger projects the standard award rate is progressively 
reduced. The impact of this on the standard award maxima under RAG 2007-13 is shown in 
Figure 2.3. As would be expected, the higher the amount of eligible investment, the lower 
the rate of award applicable since an increasing proportion of the investment qualifies for 
aid at only 34 per cent of the prevailing regional aid rate. Thus, for an investment of €500 
million, the maximum rate of award in a 10 percent rate ‘c’ area would be 4.22 percent of 
eligible investment – a maximum of €21.1 million. 
Figure 2.3: Impact of the large investment project provisions on award rates 
Standard ceilings (% GGE)  
10 15 20 30 40 50 
Eligible  
expenditure Adjusted ceilings (% GGE) 
€ 50 m 10.00 15.00 20.00 30.00 40.00 50.00 
€ 100 m 7.50 11.25 15.00 22.50 30.00 37.50 
€ 150 m 6.13 9.20 12.27 18.40 24.53 30.67 
€ 200 m 5.45 8.18 10.90 16.35 21.80 27.25 
€ 300 m 4.77 7.15 9.53 14.30 19.07 23.83 
€ 500 m 4.22 6.33 8.44 12.66 16.88 21.10 
 
                                                 
27 Whether block-exempted or notified and approved investment aid schemes. 
EU Competition policy and regional State aid 
European Policy Research Paper No. 80  European Policies Research Centre 8
Crucially, however, individual notification is required where the aid proposed is higher 
than that which a project involving eligible investment of €100 million could have obtained 
on the basis of the application of the formula.  
Figure 2.4: Individual notification ceilings for large investment projects 
 Standard ceilings (% GGE) 
 10 15 20 30 40 50 
 Aid notification threshold (€ million) 
 7.5 11.25 15.0 22.5 30.0 37.5 
Eligible expenditure Notification threshold (% of eligible expenditure) 
€ 50 m ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 
€ 100 m ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 
€ 150 m 5.0 7.5 10.0 15.0 20.0 25.0 
€ 200 m 3.75 5.63 7.5 11.25 15.0 18.75 
€ 300 m 2.5 3.75 5.0 7.5 10.0 12.5 
€ 500 m 1.5 2.25 3.0 4.5 6.0 7.5 
 
As Figure 2.4 shows, for very large projects the notification thresholds bite at very low 
levels of aid when expressed as a percentage of investment. In a 10 percent rate area, the 
notification threshold in proposed aid would be €7.5 million, just 1.5 percent of a €500 
million investment. 
Where a project is notified to the Commission because of the size of the award, the 
Commission has a degree of discretion in the assessment criteria and the decision about 
whether aid up to that stipulated in the matrix can be awarded. The key issues in the 
assessment of aid to notified projects concern the market share of the beneficiary and the 
capacity created by the project. 
For individually notifiable projects where either: 
a. the aid beneficiary accounts for more than 25 percent of the sales of the products 
concerned on the markets concerned (either before or after the investment); or 
b. the capacity created by the project is more than 5 per cent of the size of the 
market measured in apparent consumption, except in rapidly growing markets,  
the Commission will only approve regional aid after opening the Article 108(2) 
investigative procedure and a “detailed verification… that the aid is necessary to provide 
an incentive effect for the investment and that the benefits of the aid outweigh the 
resulting distortion of competition and effect on trade”. This verification is based on 
detailed guidance published by the Commission.28 
The onus is on the Member States to demonstrate that a given project does not reinforce a 
high market share or increase capacity in a stagnant sector. Where no such competition 
concerns arise, the matrix given in Figure 2.2 is used to determine the maximum rate, as 
for projects under the €100 million investment threshold. 
                                                 
28 Communication from the Commission concerning the criteria for an in-depth assessment of regional 
aid to large investment projects, OJEU No C 223/3 of 16 September 2009. 
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2.5 National perspectives on the operation of the regulatory 
architecture 
Preliminary reactions suggest that national policymakers are reasonably content with the 
overall system of disciplining regional aid. Member States generally recognise and accept 
the need to calibrate the level of scrutiny to the perceived risk to competition. Also, many 
appreciate the capacity to be able to implement aid schemes without prior notification on 
the basis of the GBER; others, however, note that this shifts the responsibility for 
compliance and the associated administrative burden to the Member States, and there are 
some concerns about the implications of possible audits. A number of policymakers point to 
discrepancies of detail or wording between RAG 2007-13 and the GBER. It is widely assumed 
that these inconsistencies would be dealt with as part of the reform process. In addition, 
however, some suggested that the RAG and the GBER be combined into a single document 
in order that the rules relating to regional aid be consolidated. Notwithstanding the general 
satisfaction with the regulatory architecture, two main issues seem likely to be subject to 
discussion. 
One area of inconsistency concerns the requirement for an incentive effect. In RAG 2007-
13 the sole requirement for demonstrating incentive effect is that the application should 
have been submitted prior to project start; by contrast, in GBER, the requirements are 
more demanding, at least in the case of large firms. It is assumed that in the forthcoming 
reform the more stringent line would be taken. However, views are divided on whether the 
demonstration of an incentive effect should be yet more demanding, with a view to 
improving the effectiveness of aid, or whether such steps would simply increase the 
administrative burden without any guaranteed improvement in efficacy. However, on 
balance, the vast majority of Member States who expressed an opinion were opposed to any 
reinforcement of the incentive effect provisions at the EU level, this being viewed as 
largely the concern of domestic policymakers. 
Although Member States generally accept the need for a higher level of scrutiny to large 
investment projects, concerns are raised about several aspects of the current rules. As 
outlined above, the treatment of large investment projects comprises two main elements: 
lower rates of award for eligible investment exceeding €50 million; and case-by-case 
notification and approval where the proposed award exceeds the amount that a €100 
million could receive in that area. Many Member States now consider the notification 
threshold to be too low and propose that it be revised in line with inflation; there is also 
the suggestion that the threshold should be set in a different way. However, these views 
are not universally held and some see no need for a revision of the notification thresholds 
at all. A general issue is that the notification and approval procedure is considered too 
lengthy and complex. Several Member States point to the need to engage lawyers and 
consultants in order to provide supporting evidence, adding to the cost of the process for 
the Member States and the applicant firm. There is a widespread perceived need to simplify 
the process and clarify the information required and several countries point to the negative 
effect of the administrative burden on the attractiveness of the EU as an investment 
location. Other points raised concern: the need to review the possibility of retaining SME 
bonuses for large investment projects; and the need to clarify the notion of a single 
investment project.  
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3. SPATIAL COVERAGE 
The current basis for approving the assisted area maps of the Member States are the 2007-
13 Regional Aid Guidelines.29 Section 3.1 describes the basic principles for determining the 
spatial coverage of regional aid under those Guidelines. Section 3.2 considers how spatial 
coverage might be determined post-2013. 
3.1 Basic principles of spatial coverage under RAG 2007-13 
The underlying principle governing spatial coverage in the Regional Aid Guidelines is the 
“exceptional nature of regional aid” so that the Commission considers that the total 
population of the assisted regions should be “substantially” less than that of the non-
assisted regions.30 On this basis, the Guidelines set the initial ceiling at 42 percent of the 
EU25 population, this being “similar” to the limit set for the EU15 in 1998 (42.7 percent).31 
However, the application of the safety net, which ensures that no Member States would 
lose more than 50 percent of its current coverage, raises the overall ceiling to 43.1 percent 
of the EU25 population or 46.6 percent of the EU27 population, with the accession of 
Bulgaria and Romania which have ‘a’ region status in their entirety.32 
3.1.1 Coverage of ‘a’ regions 
(i) ‘Classic’ ‘a’ regions 
Article 107(3)(a) provides that “aid to promote the economic development of areas where 
the standard of living is abnormally low or where there is serious underemployment” may 
be considered compatible with the common market. The European Court of Justice has held 
that this provision applies only to areas which are disadvantaged in relation to the 
Community as whole.33 For its part, the Commission takes the view that GDP per head in 
purchasing power standards (PPS) “is capable of reflecting synthetically both phenomena 
mentioned.”34 This seems a debatable interpretation both of the Treaty provisions and the 
statistical indicators: Article 107(3)(a) does not require low standards of living and 
underemployment to be present, but rather views them as alternatives; moreover, 
GDP(PPS) per head measures neither phenomenon. Nevertheless, it is clear that the 
Commission’s view is now well-entrenched in State aid policy and practice and is further 
embedded by the use of the same indicators for Convergence regions under EU Cohesion 
policy. Accordingly, the ‘a’ areas for 2007-13 are defined as NUTS 2 regions where GDP(PPS) 
per head is less than 75 percent of the EU25 average for the period 2000-2. The ‘a’ regions, 
together with the other ‘earmarked’ areas (described below) are illustrated in Map 3.1. 
                                                 
29 Guidelines on National Regional Aid for 2007-13, OJEU No C 54 of 4 March 2006. 
30 Paragraph 12. 
31 The ceiling was set at 42.7 percent, see: National ceilings for regional aid coverage under the 
derogations provided for in Article 92(3)(a) and (c) [now Article 107] of the Treaty for the period 
2000 to 2006, OJEC No C 16 of 21 January 1999. However, it was exceeded by the inclusion of 
Northern Ireland in addition to the UK quota, instead of within it. The resulting total was around 43 
percent, see: Figure 34, pp 205, Wishlade, F. (2003) Regional State Aid and Competition Policy in the 
European Union, Kluwer Law international, The Hague. 
32 Paragraph 13. 
33 Case 248/84 Germany v Commission [1987] ECR 4013 at 4042. 
34 Paragraph 16, footnote 19.  
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Map 3.1: ‘Earmarked’ areas 2007-13 
Regional aid 2007-13
'Earmarked' regions
'a' region 50%
'a' region 40%
'a' region 30%
Statistical effect 30% to 20%
Economic development 10%/15%
Low population density 15%
 
Source: Own elaboration after DG Comp regional aid map available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/regional_aid/map.pdf  
(ii) Outermost regions 
In addition, under the 2007-13 Guidelines, the seven Outermost regions (OMR)35 have ‘a’ 
region status, irrespective of whether they meet the GDP per head threshold. Five of the 
seven are below the threshold, but Canarias and Madeira both had per capita GDP of around 
88 percent of the EU25 average under the dataset used for 2007-13. In spite of the 
emphasis on ‘coherence’ between the two policy areas, Canarias and Madeira have 
‘Phasing-in’ status under the Competitiveness and Employment strand of Cohesion policy, 
rather than Convergence status, although special additional budgetary allocations were 
made to all OMRs for 2007-13. 
(iii) Statistical effect regions 
Last, transitional arrangements were made for the so-called ‘statistical effect’ regions. 
These are regions with GDP per head above the EU25 qualifying threshold, but which would 
                                                 
35 Açores, Madeira, Canarias, Guadeloupe, Martinique, Réunion and Guyane. 
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have qualified as ‘a’ areas had it not been for enlargement (equivalent to Phasing-out 
regions under EU Cohesion policy); the qualifying threshold was 82.2 percent of EU25 
GDP(PPS) per head. Significantly, not all of the eligible regions had ‘a’ region status in the 
pre-2000 period – namely: Hainaut (Belgium); Lüneburg (Germany); and Highlands and 
Islands (UK). Statistical effect regions will retain ‘a’ region status at least until 31 
December 2010. During 2010 Commission reviewed the position of the regions concerned on 
the basis of the most recent GDP data available (2005-7). Regions where GDP per head had 
fallen to below 75 percent of the EU25 average retained ‘a’ region status; the remainder 
became ‘c’ areas from 1 January 2011. Consequently, Hainaut (Belgium), Basilicata (Italy), 
Kentriki Makedonia and Dytiki Makedonia (Greece) have full ‘a’ region status for 2011-2013 
while the remaining statistical effect areas have ‘c’ area status. 
3.1.2 Coverage of ‘c’ areas 
Article 107(3)(c) provides that “aid to facilitate the development of certain economic 
activities or of certain economic areas, where such aid does not adversely affect trading 
conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest” may be compatible with the 
common market. The European Court has confirmed that this provision is wider than Article 
107(3)(a) and that it gives the Commission the authority to allow Member States to offer 
regional aid in areas that are disadvantaged in relation to the national average. 
The Guidelines stress that, because the ‘c’ areas are less disadvantaged than the ‘a’ areas, 
their geographical scope and the aid intensity must be strictly limited and only a small part 
of the national territory may normally qualify for aid.36 The determination of the coverage 
of ‘c’ areas is a two-stage process: first, the Commission sets a population coverage ceiling 
for each Member State; second, eligible areas are selected by the Member States, subject 
to approval by the Commission. In addition, there are transitional provisions for some areas 
which previously had ‘c’ status. 
Overall ‘c’ coverage in 2007-13 comprises the following elements. 
 Economic development: each Member State automatically received a quota 
equivalent to the population of areas that had ‘out-grown’ ‘a’ area status and were 
also beyond the threshold for statistical effect regions – in other words, regions that 
would have ceased to qualify as ‘a’ regions even without the impact of enlargement 
on EU average GDP per head. Northern Ireland was added to this group; although it 
was not an ‘a’ area in 2000-6, it was considered to have benefited from the same 
aid intensities as many ‘a’ areas37 - see Map 3.1. 
 Low population density: NUTS 3 areas with fewer than 12.5 inhabitants per km2 – 
again, see Map 3.1. 
 A population quota based on internal disparities in GDP per head and 
unemployment: the remaining population (ie. 42 percent, less the ‘a’ areas, the 
                                                 
36 Paragraph 22. 
37 Paragraph 25. 
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economic development areas and the low population density areas) is distributed 
between the Member States. The formula for doing so is set out in the Guidelines38 
and follows the approach in the 1998 Guidelines. The principle of the method is to 
calculate the population of NUTS 3 regions where either GDP per head is more than 
15 percent below the national average or the unemployment rate is more than 15 
percent above the national average. However, these thresholds are adjusted to 
reflect the national situation in the EU context, so that, in more prosperous 
countries, the GDP per head disparity must be greater in order for a region to count 
towards the quota and in poorer countries the disparity required is less. The same 
applies to unemployment rates. For 2007-13, this adjustment meant that, for 
example, the GDP threshold for the Netherlands was lowered from 85 percent to 
77.2 percent of the national average, whereas the Greek threshold was raised from 
85 percent to 99.5 percent of the national average.39 
 Safety net: special provision was made to ensure that no Member State lost more 
than 50 percent of its total population coverage under the 2000-6 Guidelines. The 
application of the safety net raised the initial 42 percent ceiling to around 43.1 
percent (excluding Bulgaria and Romania). 
Provisions for the phasing out of ‘c’ areas were also included in the Guidelines. These 
enabled a proportion of previous ‘c’ areas to remain eligible until 1 January 2009. Coverage 
of the transitional ‘c’ areas together with the ‘c’ areas based on the quota and safety net 
provisions could not exceed 66 percent of ‘c’ coverage as at 31 December 2006 (excluding 
areas which qualify as statistical effect, economic development and low population density 
areas from 1 January 2007).40 
3.1.3 Overall outcomes 2007-13 
The outcome of the application of this methodology is illustrated in Figure 3.1. This shows 
that while 46.6 percent of the EU27 population falls within assisted areas, this is heavily 
skewed towards the 12 ‘new’ Member States (hereafter EU12),41 where 98 percent of the 
population is covered; by contrast, in the EU15, coverage is under one-third of the 
population.  
                                                 
38 Annex IV. It is described in detail in Wishlade, F. (2005) ‘Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose? 
Recent Developments in EU competition policy control of regional aid’ European Policy Research 
Paper 58, European Policies Research Centre, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow. 
39 Examples given in Annex IV of the Guidelines. Note also that, in practice, Greece is entirely 
covered by ‘a’ areas or economic development areas, which have ‘c’ status for the 2007-13 period. 
40 Paragraph 95. 
41 Hereafter EU10 refers to the countries which joined in 2004. 
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Figure 3.1: Coverage of assisted areas 2007-13 (% of population) 
 ‘a’ areas 
‘a’ - Stat 
effect 
‘c’ - Econ 
dev 
‘c’ – low 
pop dens 
‘c’ - 
quota 
‘c’ 
trans. 
2007-
13 Total 
EU27 32.2 3.4 3.6 0.5 6.9 3.5 46.6 
EU25 27.7 3.6 3.8 0.5 7.4 3.8 43.0 
EU15 15.0 4.3 3.8 0.6 8.7 4.2 32.4 
EU10 92.9 0.0 3.8 0.0 0.5 1.8 97.2 
EU12 94.9 0.0 2.7 0.0 0.3 1.2 98.0 
BE  12.4     13.5  25.9 
BU 100.0      100.0 
CZ  88.6        7.7 88.6 
DK       8.6 2.7 8.6 
DE 12.5 6.1     11.0  29.6 
EE 100.0         100.0 
IE   26.5   23.5 25.0 50.0 
GR 36.6 55.5 7.9      100.0 
ES 36.2 5.8 16.1 0.6 1.1 12.4 59.8 
FR 2.9      15.5 6.9 18.4 
IT 29.2 1.0 2.9   1.0 5.6 34.1 
CY       50.0 16.0 50.0 
LV 100.0         100.0 
LT 100.0         100.0 
LU       16.0 5.1 16.0 
HU 72.2  27.8      100.0 
MT 100.0         100.0 
NL       7.5 2.4 7.5 
AT  3.4     19.1  22.5 
PL 100.0         100.0 
PT 70.1 3.8     2.8 19.2 76.7 
RO 100.0      100.0 
SI 100.0         100.0 
SK 88.9        7.5 88.9 
FI   4.9 18.8 9.3  33.0 
SE   0.0 13.0 2.3  15.3 
UK 4.0 0.6 7.3   12.0  23.9 
EEA3    29.4   29.4 
IS    37.7   37.7 
LI       0.0 
NO    29.1   29.1 
Note: All the Statistical Effect regions became either ‘a’ regions of ‘c’ regions from 1 
January 2011. Transitional ‘c’ area coverage is not included in the total for 2007-13; the 
Iceland total applies from 2008-13, follows a reorganisation of the NUTS regions. 
Source: Own calculations from: Eurostat data; RAG 2007-13; Icelandic regional aid maps 
authorised by the EFTA Surveillance Authority, ESA Press Release PR(06)54; The EFTA 
Surveillance Authority adopts new Regional Aid Guidelines for 2007-13, ESA Press Release 
PR(06)18. 
3.2 Spatial coverage 2014+? 
To date, the Commission has given no indication of its intentions for determining spatial 
coverage after 2013. At the March 2011 workshop this was partly justified by the absence of 
up-to-date data and partly by the uncertainty surrounding future arrangements for 
Cohesion policy. However, although the GDP data on which spatial coverage would in 
principle be based, are not yet published, it is still possible to make some plausible 
estimates. Moreover, since the March 2011 RAG workshop, the Commission has published 
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outline proposals for Cohesion policy 2014-20, indicating transitional arrangements for two 
groups of regions: those losing Convergence status; and those with GDP(PPS) per head in 
the range 75-90 percent of the EU average.42  
Nevertheless, a number of significant ‘unknowns’ remain: What overall level of coverage 
might the Commission set? What account might it take of proposals for Cohesion policy 
reform? To what extent, if at all, will existing provisions for minimum coverage (the ‘safety 
net’) remain? The discussion that follows explores the options and outcomes taking account 
of these issues. Two main sets of scenarios emerge, reflecting the possible treatment of 
transitional areas identified under the Cohesion policy proposals: 
 In a ‘rolling forward’ scenario, the existing methodology would essentially be 
reapplied, with some small adjustments. The ‘statistical effect’ category could be 
dropped (few regions would fall into this grouping owing to the narrow eligibility 
band arising from enlargement from EU25 to EU27), but those losing ‘a’ status 
would have economic development ‘c’ area status as previously 
 In a ‘sliding scale’ scenario, the existing methodology would be reapplied. 
However, regions with GDP(PPS) per head in the range 75-90 percent of the EU27 
average would also be entitled to ‘c’ area status, irrespective of whether they had 
qualified as Convergence regions previously. 
For the discussion which follows, and the calculations on which they are based, the key 
working assumptions are: 
 As for 2007-13, the initial coverage ceiling is 42 percent of the EU population, 
prior to the application of the safety net – in effect this is a further lowering of 
coverage since the 2007-13 ceiling referred to EU25; the EU27 equivalent would be 
45.5 percent 
 ‘a’ regions are defined as NUTS 2 regions with GDP(PPS) per head of less than 75 
percent of the EU27 average 
 as before, a safety net is applied such that, for 2014+, no country loses more than 
50 percent of its 2007-13 coverage 
 regional GDP data for 2007-8 have been used, together with estimates for 200943 
(2000-2 were used under RAG 2007-13) 
 regional unemployment rate data for 2008-9 have been used (2001-3 were used 
under RAG 2007-13); note that data are not complete for all countries 
 EU27 is taken as the basis for all EU averages44 
                                                 
42 European Commission (2011) A Budget for Europe, COM(2011)500 final, 29 June 2011. 
43 These are author’s estimates, based on national growth rates. 
44 Croatia will likely accede too late for data to be calculated on an EU28 basis. 
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 as previously, the outermost regions have ‘a’ status irrespective of GDP per head 
 the criterion for determining low population density areas remains the same 
(essentially NUTS 3 areas with fewer than 12.5 inhabitants per km2) 
 the methodology for distributing ‘quotas’ of ‘c’ area population between countries 
(ie. after the determination of ‘earmarked’ regions) remains as outlined in RAG 
2007-13 
 no transitional arrangements are made for areas losing ‘c’ status. This differs 
from the past approach, but in any event transitional ‘c’ area status was a late 
addition to the 2007-13 Guidelines and applied only for two years. 
3.3 Rolling forward scenario 
In the rolling forward scenario, regions losing ‘a’ status are ‘earmarked’ as ‘c’ regions along 
with low population density regions. This is illustrated in Map 3.2. 
Map 3.2: ‘Earmarked’ regions under the rolling forward scenario 2014+? 
Regional aid areas 2014+?
GDP(PPS) per head 2007-9 (est)
'a' areas   (64)
Form er 'a' areas   (22)
Low population density
 
Source: Own calculations from Eurostat data. 
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At a global level, rolling the methodology forward on the basis outlined above results in a 
reduction in coverage for all types of assisted area except for the sparsely-populated areas; 
outermost regions are, effectively, also ring-fenced within ‘a’ region coverage.  
Figure 3.2: ‘Rolling forward’ scenario - assisted area coverage 2014+? (% of population) 
 ‘a' areas ‘c’ – econ dev 
‘c’ – low pop 
dens ‘c’ - quota Total 
EU27 24.7 7.8 0.5 9.2 42.2 
EU25 20.4 7.8 0.6 9.8 38.6 
EU15 8.5 7.6 0.7 11.4 28.2 
NMS12 86.1 8.6 0.0 0.6 95.3 
BE 0 12.2 0 11.5 23.7 
BG 100.0 0 0 0 100.0 
CZ 88.2 0 0 0 88.2 
DK 0 0 0 7.6 7.6 
DE 0 13.0 0 14.1 27.2 
EE 100.0 0 0 0 100.0 
IE 0 0 0 25.0 25.0 
GR 15.1 40.9 0.2 2.0 58.2 
ES 6.9 28.2 0.5 8.4 44.0 
FR 2.9 0 0 16.8 19.7 
IT 28.5 1.0 0 2.6 32.1 
CY 0 0 0 25.0 25.0 
LV 100.0 0 0 0 100.0 
LT 100.0 0 0 0 100.0 
LU 0 0 0 8.0 8.0 
HU 71.5 0 0 4.7 76.1 
MT 0 100.0 0 0 100.0 
NL 0 0 0 3.8 3.8 
AT 0 0 0 20.2 20.2 
PL 86.4 13.6 0 0 100.0 
PT 69.8 0 0 2.9 72.7 
RO 89.1 10.9 0 0 100.0 
SI 53.8 46.3 0 0 100.0 
SK 88.9 0 0 0 88.9 
FI 0 0 19.8 9.1 28.9 
SE 0 0 12.6 0 12.6 
UK 4 0 0.4 18.4 22.7 
EEA3     26.7   26.7 
IS 0 0 37.5 0 37.5 
LI 0 0 0 0 0 
NO 0 0 26.2 0 26.2 
Note: This assumes initial coverage of 42 percent of EU27 population and a safety net of 50 
percent of previous national coverage; for alternative scenarios see Figure 3.3. 
Source: Own calculations from Eurostat data. 
Detailed outcomes are illustrated in Figure 3.2 and may be summarised as follows: 
 Overall coverage falls from 46.6 percent to 42.2 percent (after the application of safety 
nets). This outcome is essentially the consequence of applying the same initial ceiling – 
42 percent of the population as previously - to a different population base: whereas the 
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previous ceiling was, in effect, 42 percent of the EU25 population plus Bulgaria and 
Romania, under this scenario, the initial ceiling applies to the EU27 population, 
effectively cutting population coverage by about four percentage points. 
 For the EU15, coverage would fall from 32.4 percent to 28.2 percent. 
 For the EU12, coverage would fall from 98 percent to 95.3 percent of the population. 
Overall coverage outcomes for individual Member States vary widely, with some seeing 
significant reductions (e.g. Ireland, Greece, Spain, Cyprus, Netherlands, Hungary) and 
others seeing coverage unchanged (most of the EU12), though this may conceal shifts 
between ‘a’ region and ‘c’ area coverage. The ‘earmarked’ coverage arising from these 
calculations is shown in Map 3.2, above.  
The reduction in ‘a’ region coverage across the EU27 is significant (from around 32 percent 
to about 25 percent of the EU population), but the distribution of change is uneven: 
 In Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, France, Hungary, 
Portugal, Slovakia and the United Kingdom the position would remain unchanged; in 
Italy, the position would be the same as in 2007-10, with Basilicata falling outside full 
‘a’ status. 
 In Germany, Greece, Spain, Malta, Poland, Romania and Slovenia, there would be 
substantial reductions in ‘a’ coverage. In Germany, there would be no ‘a’ regions and 
Malta would cease to be covered. In Greece, coverage would fall from around 37 
percent in 2007-10 to 15 percent after 2013 (as in Italy, two Greek regions had their 
status revised from statistical effect to full ‘a’ status for 2011-3, but these regions 
would cease to qualify as ‘a’ regions after 2013). In Spain, only Extremadura would be 
an ‘a’ region. In Poland and Romania the capital regions would cease to qualify. In 
Slovenia, the splitting of the country in two NUTS 2 regions means that ‘a’ status would 
cover around 54 percent of the population. 
The calculations presented above in some respects represent a status quo option, though 
the 42 percent initial ceiling is, in effect, a lower ceiling than at present owing to 
enlargement from EU25 to EU27. Clearly, the ceiling could be subject to negotiation, 
though the Commission has stressed that in any event coverage would remain below 50 
percent. In addition, and as noted earlier, on the basis of this scenario, many countries 
would see significant cutbacks in coverage, suggesting that, as in the past, the negotiation 
of some form of safety net is also likely to be an issue. The impact of variants on the basic 
scenario by adjusting the ceiling or the safety net is set out in Figure 3.2. This shows that: 
 Coverage in some countries is unaffected by changes in either the safety net or overall 
coverage. These are countries where coverage is entirely comprised of ‘earmarked’ 
areas, these being and there is no ‘quota’ of ‘c’ areas, namely: Bulgaria, Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia and 
Sweden 
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 A further group of countries is unaffected by the safety net even if raised to 75 
percent, but coverage rises or falls depending on the initial ceiling, namely: Belgium, 
Denmark, Germany, France, Italy, Hungary, Austria, Portugal, Finland, United Kingdom 
 A third group would, or might depend on the safety net to secure coverage. Coverage in 
Ireland and the Netherlands would be substantially reduced in the absence of a safety 
net – it could be as low as 14.9 percent or 1.9 percent of the population respectively if 
the initial coverage were reduced to 42 percent of the EU27 population. There would 
be no coverage in Luxembourg or Cyprus if there were no safety net. Greece would 
have an interest in a safety net, depending on the level at which it were set: at 50 
percent it would not alter outcomes, at 75 percent it would. 
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Figure 3.3: Impact of population ceilings and safety net variants within ‘rolling forward’ scenario 
Current
2007-13 Lower ceiling, 
same safety 
net
Current initial ceiling 
(EU27 basis), same 
safety net
Lower ceiling, 
higher safety 
net
Current initial 
ceiling, higher 
safety net
Lower initial 
ceiling, no 
safety net
Current initial 
ceiling, no 
safety net
Initial_ceiling 
(EU27)
42 (EU25) 
45.5 (EU27)
42 45.5 42 45.5 42 45.5
Safety_net 50 50 50 75 75 0 0
EU_27 46.6 42.2 45.6 42.8 46.2 42.0 45.5
Belgium 25.9 23.7 28.1 23.7 28.1 23.7 28.1
Bulgaria 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Czech 88.6 88.2 88.2 88.2 88.2 88.2 88.2
Denmark 8.6 7.6 10.6 7.6 10.6 7.6 10.6
Germany 29.6 27.2 32.7 27.2 32.7 27.2 32.7
Estonia 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Ireland 50.0 25.0 25.0 37.5 37.5 14.9 20.7
Greece 100.0 58.2 59.0 75.0 75.0 58.2 59.0
Spain 59.6 44.0 47.3 44.7 47.3 44.0 47.3
France 18.4 19.7 26.3 19.7 26.3 19.7 26.3
Italy 34.1 32.1 33.1 32.1 33.1 32.1 33.1
Cyprus 50.0 25.0 25.0 37.5 37.5 0.0 0.0
Latvia 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Lithuania 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Luxembourg 16.0 8.0 8.0 12.0 12.0 0.0 0.0
Hungary 100.0 76.1 77.9 76.1 77.9 76.1 77.9
Malta 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Netherlands 7.5 3.8 3.8 5.6 5.6 1.9 2.7
Austria 22.5 20.2 28.0 20.2 28.0 20.2 28.0
Poland 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Portugal 76.7 72.7 73.8 72.7 73.8 72.7 73.8
Romania 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Slovenia 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Slovakia 88.9 88.9 88.9 88.9 88.9 88.9 88.9
Finland 33.0 28.9 32.4 28.9 32.4 28.9 32.4
Sweden 15.3 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6
United_Kingdom 23.9 22.7 29.9 22.7 29.9 22.7 29.9
Variants on the 'rolling forward' scenario (NO earmarking of 'sliding scale' transitional regions)
 
Source: Own calculations from Eurostat data. 
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3.4 Sliding scale scenario 
In the ‘sliding scale’ scenario account is taken of Commission proposals for transitional 
regions under Cohesion policy. As noted, this envisages two groups of transitional area: 
 those with Convergence status in 2007-13, but which do not qualify as such post-2013; 
 those with GDP(PPS) per head in the range 75-90 percent of EU27 GDP. 
It remains to be seen to what extent (if at all) the proposals for Cohesion policy transitional 
regions will feed into the reform of the RAG. However, historically, there has been a 
tendency for the rules governing regional aid to reflect the Structural Funds provisions and 
it is therefore interesting to consider the implications for regional aid policy of ‘sliding 
scale’ regions also being earmarked as ‘c’ regions. In this scenario, the treatment of the 
other ‘earmarked’ regions remains the same – in particular, former ‘a’ regions in the range 
75-90 percent of EU27 GDP(PPS) per head are not included in the ‘sliding scale’ category.  
Map 3.3: ‘Earmarked’ regions under the sliding scale scenario 2014+? 
Regional aid areas 2014+?
GDP(PPS) per head 2007-9 (est)
'a' areas   (64)
Form er 'a' areas   (22)
Sliding scale   (33)
Low population density
 
Source: Own calculations from Eurostat data. 
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The key differences between the ‘rolling forward’ and the ‘sliding scale’ scenarios lie in the 
coverage of the ‘c’ areas. Under ‘sliding scale’ scenario coverage of the ‘a’ areas and the 
former ‘a’ areas remains the same. However, the introduction of a new category of 
‘earmarked’ ‘c’ area has the effect of reducing the ‘c’ quota total (from 9 percent of the 
population to just 1 percent – prior to the application of the safety net). Moreover, the 
outcomes vary significantly between countries, largely reflecting the distribution of ‘sliding 
scale’ areas. These outcomes are illustrated in Figure 3.4. 
For around half the Member States there is no difference in coverage between the ‘rolling 
forward’ and the ‘sliding scale’ scenarios - assuming the same basis for overall population 
coverage and the safety net – compare Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.4. This is true for Bulgaria, 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, 
Poland, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia and Sweden: in these countries coverage remains 
unchanged between the two scenarios. 
Seven Member States would lose coverage on the basis of the sliding scale scenario 
(compared with the rolling forward scenario), specifically: Denmark, Germany, Greece, 
Spain, Hungary, Austria, Finland. In some cases the reductions are substantial, for 
example: in Germany coverage would fall to 20.1 percent (compared to 29.6 percent at 
present and 27.2 percent under rolling forward); in Spain coverage would fall to 39.9 
percent (compared to 59.8 percent at present and 44 percent under rolling forward); and in 
Austria coverage would fall to 11.3 percent (compared to 22.5 percent at present and 20.2 
percent under rolling forward). 
Two countries would see a modest increase in coverage in relation to the rolling forward 
scenario: in Italy the sliding scale scenario results in coverage of 35.2 percent (compared 
with 34.1 percent at present and 32.1 percent under rolling forward); in the United 
Kingdom, coverage would be 23.2 percent (compared with 23.9 percent at present, but 
22.7 percent under rolling forward). 
Two countries would see significant increases both in relation to current coverage and the 
rolling forward scenario: in Belgium coverage would be 30.3 percent under the sliding scale 
scenario (compared to 25.9 percent at present and 23.7 percent under rolling forward); and 
in France coverage would be 31.8 percent (compared with 18.4 percent at present and 19.7 
percent under rolling forward).  
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Figure 3.4: ‘Sliding scale’ scenario - assisted area coverage 2014+? (% of population) 
 
‘a' areas ‘c’ – econ dev 
‘c’ ‘sliding 
scale 
‘c’ – low 
pop dens ‘c’ - quota Total 
EU27 24.7 7.8 8.1 0.4 1.5 42.5 
EU25 20.4 7.8 8.6 0.4 0.0 37.2 
EU15 8.5 7.6 10.2 0.5 0.0 26.8 
EU12 86.1 8.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 94.7 
BE 0 12.2 16.7 0 1.3 30.3 
BG 100.0 0 0 0 0 100.0 
CZ 88.2 0 0 0 0 88.2 
DK 0 0 0 0 4.3 4.3 
DE 0 13 5.1 0 2.0 20.1 
EE 100.0 0 0 0 0 100.0 
IE 0 0 0 0 25 25.0 
GR 15.1 40.9 0 0.2 0.3 56.5 
ES 6.9 28.2 3.1 0.5 1.1 39.9 
FR 2.9 0 27.5 0 1.4 31.8 
IT 28.5 1.0 5.6 0 0.1 35.2 
CY 0 0 0 0 25 25.0 
LV 100.0 0 0 0 0 100.0 
LT 100.0 0 0 0 0 100.0 
LU 0 0 0 0 8.0 8.0 
HU 71.5 0 0 0 0.7 72.2 
MT 0 100.0 0 0 0 100.0 
NL 0 0 0 0 3.8 3.8 
AT 0 0 3.4 0 7.9 11.3 
PL 86.4 13.6 0 0 0 100.0 
PT 69.8 0 4.0 0 0.5 74.3 
RO 89.1 10.9 0 0 0 100.0 
SI 53.8 46.3 0 0 0 100.0 
SK 88.9 0 0 0 0 88.9 
FI 0 0 12.5 12.1 1.2 25.7 
SE 0 0 0 12.6 0 12.6 
UK 4.0 0 17.1 0 2.1 23.2 
EEA3    26.7   26.7 
IS    37.5 0 37.5 
LI    0 0 0 
NO    26.2 0 26.2 
Note: This assumes initial coverage of 42 percent of EU27 population and a safety net of 50 
percent of previous national coverage; for variants see Figure 3.5. 
Source: Own calculations from Eurostat data. 
As with the rolling forward scenario, there is also scope for variants, notably by adjusting 
the initial population coverage ceiling or the level at which the safety net applies to 
reductions in coverage. These are illustrated in Figure 3.5. 
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Figure 3.5: Impact of population ceilings and safety net variants within ‘sliding scale’ scenario 
Current
2007-13 Lower ceiling, 
same safety net
Current initial ceiling 
(EU27 basis), same 
safety net
Lower ceiling, 
higher safety net
Current initial 
ceiling, higher 
safety net
Lower initial 
ceiling, no 
safety net
Current initial 
ceiling, no safety 
net
Initial_ceiling
42 (EU25) 
45.5 (EU27) 42 45.5 42 45.5 42 45.5
Safety_net 50 50 50 75 75 0 0
EU_27 46.6 42.5 45.8 44.0 46.5 42.0 45.5
Belgium 25.9 30.3 34.6 30.3 34.6 30.3 34.6
Bulgaria 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Czech 88.6 88.2 88.2 88.2 88.2 88.2 88.2
Denmark 8.6 4.3 5.2 6.5 6.5 1.2 5.2
Germany 29.6 20.1 26.7 22.2 26.7 20.1 26.7
Estonia 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Ireland 50.0 25.0 25.0 37.5 37.5 2.4 10.2
Greece 100.0 56.5 57.6 75.0 75.0 56.5 57.6
Spain 59.6 39.9 43.7 44.7 44.7 39.9 43.7
France 18.4 31.8 36.5 31.8 36.5 31.8 36.5
Italy 34.1 35.2 35.5 35.2 35.5 35.2 35.5
Cyprus 50.0 25.0 25.0 37.5 37.5 0.0 0.0
Latvia 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Lithuania 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Luxembourg 16.0 8.0 8.0 12.0 12.0 0.0 0.0
Hungary 100.0 72.2 74.7 75.0 75.0 72.2 74.7
Malta 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Netherlands 7.5 3.8 3.8 5.6 5.6 0.3 1.3
Austria 22.5 11.3 16.3 16.9 16.9 6.4 16.3
Poland 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Portugal 76.7 74.3 75.8 74.3 75.8 74.3 75.8
Romania 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Slovenia 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Slovakia 88.9 88.9 88.9 88.9 88.9 88.9 88.9
Finland 33.0 25.7 29.5 25.7 29.5 25.7 29.5
Sweden 15.3 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6
United_Kingdom 23.9 23.2 30.3 23.2 30.3 23.2 30.3
Variants on the 'sliding scale' scenario (WITH earmarking of 'sliding scale' transitional regions)
 
Source: Own calculations from Eurostat data. 
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The impact of these variants differs widely between countries: 
 Some countries area unaffected by changes in either the overall coverage or the safety 
net. These are countries where coverage is wholly determined by earmarked regions, 
namely: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, 
Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia and Sweden. 
 Others are affected only by the changes in initial ceiling – if this increases, so does 
national assisted area coverage. This is true of: Belgium, France, Italy, Portugal, 
Finland, and the United Kingdom. 
 The remainder would rely to a greater or lesser extent on a safety net to secure 
coverage. Cyprus and Luxembourg would rely entirely on safety net provisions for 
coverage and in Denmark, Ireland and the Netherlands coverage would be minimal 
without such provision. Elsewhere, notably Germany, Greece, Spain, Hungary and 
Austria the level of safety net could become important if the overall ceiling were to 
stay at 42 percent of the EU27 population. 
3.5 National perspectives on spatial coverage 
As mentioned earlier, spatial coverage was not on the agenda at the March 2011 workshop. 
Nevertheless, it was a constant theme in the discussion and appears in many of the national 
responses to the questions raised by the Commission.  
Regarding overall coverage, several countries argue that coverage should not be reduced 
and that current coverage should be maintained – either in terms of the final outcome (46.6 
percent of the EU27 population) or on the basis of an initial ceiling of 45.5 percent – this 
being the EU27 equivalent of 42 percent of the EU25 population, plus Romania and 
Bulgaria. In this case the ultimate ceiling might be higher, depending on the safety net 
provisions. It was also observed that the rationale for the ceiling was unclear and that any 
proposals to reduce it should be the subject of consultation and a clear justification for the 
change.  
The definition of the ‘a’ regions also attracted some comment. As described earlier (see 
3.1.1), these are referred to in Article 107.3(a) as regions where the standard of living is 
abnormally low or where there is serious underemployment. In practice, this has been 
interpreted as NUTS 2 regions where GDP(PPS) per head is less than 75 percent of the EU 
average. Some argued that it could be complemented by criteria relating to unemployment 
or other factors indicative of economic development. There was also a suggestion that ‘a’ 
region status could be determined at NUTS 3, a proposal that would produce a quite 
different pattern of assisted areas, and distribution of population between eligible regions. 
The impact of this approach is illustrated in Figure 3.6. Compared with a NUTS 2 based 
approach, this results in higher overall ‘a’ region coverage (27.7 percent of the EU27 
population, compared with 24.7 percent using NUTS 2). Significantly, however, the ‘a’ 
region population of the EU15 would rise considerably – from 8.5 percent to 13.5 percent of 
the population, while that of the EU12 would fall from 86.1 percent to 81.3 percent of the 
population. Other outcomes would depend on initial coverage and the safety net; however, 
European Policy Research Paper No. 80  European Policies Research Centre 25
EU Competition policy and regional State aid 
it is evident that the EU12 in general would scarcely benefit from the mechanism for 
distributing the ‘c’ are population with the result that overall coverage would likely rise in 
the EU15 and fall in the EU12. 
Figure 3.6: ‘a’ regions defined at NUTS 3 – assisted area coverage 2014+? (% of 
population) 
 ‘a' areas ‘c’ low pop density 'c' - quota Total 
EU27 27.7 0.5 14.2 42.4 
EU25 23.9 0.6 15.1 39.5 
EU15 13.5 0.7 17.5 31.7 
EU12 81.3 0.0 1.9 83.2 
BE 11.2 0.0 17.9 29.2 
BG 84.3 0.0 0.0 84.3 
CZ 77.2 0.0 0.0 77.2 
DK 0.0 0.0 11.1 11.1 
DE 9.9 0.0 22.4 32.3 
EE 61.2 0.0 0.0 61.2 
IE 0.0 0.0 25.0 25.0 
GR 21.1 0.0 28.9 50.0 
ES 10.1 0.5 24.0 34.6 
FR 7.4 0.0 21.9 29.3 
IT 30.2 0.0 3.4 33.6 
CY 0.0 0.0 25.0 25.0 
LV 68.1 0.0 18.1 86.2 
LT 74.6 0.0 14.4 89.0 
LU 0.0 0.0 8.0 8.0 
HU 83.3 0.0 0.0 83.3 
MT 7.6 0.0 42.4 50.0 
NL 0.0 0.0 3.8 3.8 
AT 5.6 0.0 26.2 31.7 
PL 84.2 0.0 0.7 84.9 
PT 57.2 0.0 2.5 59.7 
RO 89.9 0.0 0.0 89.9 
SI 27.9 0.0 22.1 50.0 
SK 78.6 0.0 0.0 78.6 
FI 14.0 19.8 5.2 39.0 
SE 0.0 12.6 0.0 12.6 
UK 11.7 0.4 21.7 33.8 
EEA3  26.7  26.7 
IS 0.0 37.5 0.0 37.5 
LI 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
NO 0.0 26.2 0.0 26.2 
Note: This assumes initial coverage of 42 percent of the EU27 population and a safety net 
of 50 percent of previous national coverage. No provisions are made for transitional 
regions. 
Source: Own calculations from Eurostat data. 
The coverage of ‘a’ regions on a NUTS 3 basis is illustrated in Map 3.4. This shows that most 
countries would contain ‘a’ regions on this basis (only Denmark, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Ireland, Cyprus and Sweden would not), but that no country would be covered 
its entirety – the capital regions of all the EU12 would fall outside ‘a’ status. 
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Map 3.4: GDP(PPS) per head at NUTS 3 (2007-9) EU27=100 
GDP(PPS) per head EU27=100
2007-9 (est)
20 to 75  (375)
75 to 90  (295)
90 to 100  (141)
100 to 600  (488)
 
Source: Own calculations from Eurostat data. 
On a NUTS 3 basis, ‘a’ areas would be considerably more fragmented than at present, as 
Map 3.4 shows. Moreover, the effect of using smaller geographical units exacerbates 
disparities such that most countries contain regions in most of the bands illustrated on the 
map. 
A further suggestion is that GDP should be related to the population of working age rather 
than the whole population and also considered at NUTS 3, rather than NUTS 2. The 
reasoning behind the use of working age population as the denominator is to eliminate the 
‘retirement belt’ effect, whereby the population of some relatively prosperous areas is 
swelled by retired people, which then lowers the GDP per head figure for the region. 
Variations in GDP on this basis are illustrated in Map 3.5. 
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Map 3.5: GDP(PPS) per person of working age 
GDP(PPS) per person of working age, 2008
NUTS 3, EU27=100
20 to 75 (367)
75 to 90 (261)
90 to 100 (160)
100 to 600 (499)
 
Source: Own calculations from Eurostat data. 
The introduction of a criterion related to unemployment for designating ‘a’ regions is not 
straightforward either, and this for several reasons. Among these are the fact that 
unemployment rates are heavily influenced by national factors such as female participation 
rates and the structure of the welfare benefits system (this can be seen from Map 3.6). As 
such, it is doubtful whether valid comparisons can be made between regions of different 
countries for the purpose of selecting eligible areas (recalling that ‘a’ regions are 
designated in relation to the EU situation). Moreover, NUTS areas are not suitable units for 
the comparison of labour market data which is better analysed on the basis of functional 
regions. As such, it is doubtful whether a NUTS 2 or 3 map reflects accurately reflects 
unemployment realities in the Member States.45 It is also worth noting that Article 107.3(a) 
refers to “underemployment”, not unemployment. 
                                                 
45 It is also worth noting that NUTS 3 unemployment rate data is not available for all Member States. 
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Map 3.6: Unemployment rates 
Unemployment rates, NUTS 3
2009
16.7 to 29.2   (52)
11.6 to 16.7  (174)
8.4 to 11.6  (288)
5.9 to 8.4  (306)
1.3 to 5.9  (375)
 
Source: Eurostat 
These various proposals would also imply that the ‘a’ regions and the Convergence regions 
designated for EU Cohesion policy would cease to coincide; some consider that this is 
unimportant, but others take the view that the two policy maps should continue to mirror 
one another as far as possible.46 Also, while the use of NUTS 3 produces different GDP 
outcomes from NUTS 2, with whatever denominator, it does not eliminate the difficulties 
associated with the measurement of GDP at the sub-national level. Indeed, it could be 
argued that it exacerbates those difficulties since the ‘commuter effect’ is worsened at 
greater levels of disaggregation. More generally, however, it is fair to conclude from the 
responses that there seems unlikely to be widespread support for changes to the 
mechanism for designating ‘a’ areas; most considered that while the current criteria were 
flawed, it was unlikely that a better replacement could be found (and agreed on). 
                                                 
46 In practice, there are several discrepancies. For example, the OMRs have automatic ‘a’ region 
status, but do not have automatic Convergence status, which depends on their level of GDP. Also, the 
statistical effect regions were reviewed in 2010 and some retained ‘a’ status, while others were 
‘downgraded’ to ‘c’ areas, depending on their level of GDP; no such review and revision took place 
for the Phasing-out regions under Cohesion policy. 
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On the issue of transitional areas some emphasise the need for equitable arrangements for 
regions losing ‘a’ status, which, as has been shown, could cover around eight percent of the 
population. Others, by contrast, caution against extensive transitional periods, noting that, 
in effect, 2000-2 data would determine eligibility until 2020, if the attachment to 
transitional arrangements persisted. The Commission’s Budget 2020 proposals for the 
‘sliding scale’ regions were published after many national submissions were drafted, but 
was anticipated by at least one Member State which argued that these provisions should be 
taken into account for regional aid map purposes.  
Continued special provision for low population density areas was strongly supported by the 
Nordic countries, but neither supported nor opposed by other countries.  
The mechanics of deciding the ‘c’ population were not subject to much comment, save 
that one Member State argued that EU rather than national averages of GDP per head and 
unemployment should be used so that population quotas better reflected the national 
position in the EU context. However, views on the safety net were divided: some 
considered that no provision at all was required, and that any such mechanism was quite 
arbitrary; others took the view that all Member States should be entitled to pursue a 
domestic regional aid policy so that a minimum coverage should be guaranteed. It was also 
observed that some countries had experienced a 50 percent cutback in coverage in 2007-13, 
so some means should be found to avoid those Member States being affected a second time. 
Related, several countries observed that a ‘coherent’ map cannot be drawn up if 
population coverage falls to too low a level. 
4. ELIGIBLE AREAS 
4.1 Key principles for selecting eligible areas under RAG 2007-13 
As mentioned earlier, under RAG 2007-13 ‘a’ areas are designated ‘top-down’ in the rules 
themselves, while the ‘c’ areas are designated by the national authorities, subject to 
parameters set out in the Guidelines. 
For the ‘c’ areas, RAG 2007-13 distinguishes two types of assisted area that may be 
designated within the population quotas: those where firms of any size may be assisted, 
comprising comparatively large geographical areas principally meeting EU-level criteria;47 
and those where assistance is more tightly focused on localised disparities and is restricted 
to SMEs.48 In principle, the list of regions notified applies throughout the period 2007-13, 
but there is provision for a mid-term review in 2010.49 However, changes should not involve 
more than 50 percent of ‘c’ area coverage. 
                                                 
47 Paragraph 30 (a) to (h). 
48 Paragraph 31. 
49 Paragraph 104.  
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Areas which can be designated for regional investment aid to firms of any size are specified 
in the Guidelines under Paragraph 30(a)-(h) as follows: 
a. Economic development areas (areas which outgrew ‘a’ status at end 2006) 
b. Low population density (LPD) areas (NUTS 3 regions with fewer than 12.5 inhabitants 
per km2) 
c. Regions “which form contiguous zones” with a minimum population of 100,000. These 
must be within NUTS 2 or 3 regions where either GDP per head is less than the EU25 
average or unemployment is more than 115 percent of the national average. These 
criteria GDP and unemployment are sometimes referred to as the pre-eligibility 
criteria. 
d. NUTS 3 areas with a population of less than 100,000, subject to the same pre-eligibility 
criteria – i.e. either GDP per head is less than the EU25 average or unemployment is 
more than 115 percent of the national average. 
e. Islands and “other regions categorised by similar geographical isolation” where either 
GDP per head is less than the EU25 average or unemployment is more than 115 percent 
of the national average.  
f. Islands with fewer than 5,000 inhabitants and other communities with fewer than 5,000 
inhabitants characterised by similar geographical isolation.  
g. Border areas. These concern all or parts of NUTS 3 regions that are adjacent to ‘a’ 
areas and those which share a land border or a sea border of less than 30km with a 
country that is not a member of the EEA or EFTA.  
h. Areas undergoing restructuring. These must be “contiguous zones” with a minimum 
population of 50,000 which are undergoing major structural change or are in serious 
relative decline “compared with other comparable regions”.  
In paragraph 31 of the Guidelines, there is scope to target very localised regional 
disparities. However, aid is restricted to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and the 
areas targeted must involve a minimum population of 20,000. Obviously these areas also 
count towards the ‘c’ area population quotas. 
4.2 National approaches to area designation under RAG 2007-1350 
Member States adopted diverse area designation strategies to reconcile Commission 
constraints with domestic considerations. These considerations often comprised a mix of 
policy options such as indigenous or inward investment, areas of need or opportunity – and 
political issues, such as the perceived equitable distribution of assisted areas between 
                                                 
50 Detailed descriptions are available in Wishlade, F. (2007) All’s Well that Ends Well: Recent 
Developments in EU Competition Policy and Regional Aid Control, EoRPA paper 07/7 to the EoRPA 
Regional Policy Research Consortium, Ross Priory, Loch Lomondside, 7-9 October 2007. 
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regions and the sensitivity of de-designating some areas, while according assisted area 
status to others for the first time. More prosaically, an important factor was often the ease 
with which the map could be approved, sometimes leading to rather pragmatic, as opposed 
to strictly policy-oriented, approaches to area designation.  
The choice of building blocks for area designation was an important consideration for most 
countries, since most NUTS 3 regions have a population in excess of 100,000, so that 
smaller units were sought in order to build up ‘contiguous units’ of at least 100,000. In 
informal discussions early on in the process the Commission accepted the use of LAU1 and 
LAU251 as building blocks, but emphasised that any breakdown below NUTS III must be 
‘traditional’ and not simply involve units generated on an ad hoc basis for the purposes of 
the area designation exercise. 
Figure 4.1: Building blocks proposed by the Member States 
Belgium Gemeenten / Communes (LAU2) (Flanders and Wallonia); parts of communes (Brussels) 
Denmark Municipalities 
Germany Labour market regions (Arbeitsmarktregionen); Transport areas (Verkehrszelle) in Berlin 
Spain Municipios (LAU2); Census districts 
France Commune (LAU2); Cantons urbains in cities  
Ireland Counties (LAU1); District Electoral Divisions (LAU2) 
Italy Commune (LAU2) and Census areas 
Cyprus Communes 
Luxembourg Commune (LAU2) 
Netherlands Gemeenten (LAU2) and part Gemeenten 
Austria Gemeinden (LAU2) 
Portugal Freguesias (LAU2) 
Finland Maakunnat /Landskap (NUTS III); Seutukunnat (LAU1) 
Sweden Municipalities (LAU2) 
UK Wards (LAU2) 
Source: Assembled from COM decisions on regional aid maps. 
As outlined above, RAG 2007-13 set out a series of parameters within which Member States 
could propose assisted areas. Economic development areas (ie. areas that have outgrown 
‘a’ status) and sparsely-populated regions would be accepted automatically by the 
Commission as ‘c’ areas; however, Member States were also able to use the population 
quotas generated by these areas to designate other areas – provided that these meet the 
other criteria in Paragraphs 30 or 31. However, the transfer of quotas was not allowed 
where a Member State opted not to designate an ‘a’ area in its entirety. 
The broadest category for ‘c’ eligibility concerns areas with GDP(PPS) per head of less than 
the EU average or unemployment more than 15 percent above the national average – the 
pre-eligibility criteria.52 These must be either: ‘contiguous zones’ with a population of at 
least 100,000; NUTS 3 areas with a population of less than 100,000; or islands or other 
geographically isolated areas. In most countries the areas meeting the pre-eligibility 
                                                 
51 In Eurostat’s geographical classification system NUTS IV and V have been redesignated as Local 
Administrative Units and renamed LAU1 and LAU2 respectively. 
52 Paragraphs 30(c) to (e). 
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criteria were more extensive than the national population ceilings, requiring further 
selection criteria at the national level. In addition, there are specific criteria under which 
areas could be proposed53 (small islands and border areas) or criteria under which the onus 
was on the Member State to demonstrate that regional aid is justified54 (areas undergoing 
structural change and small aid areas for SMEs). 
For the Member States there were several considerations, including: how the Commission 
parameters intersect with national priorities and indicators; whether to designate solely 
within the pre-eligibility criteria; whether to use the quotas from economic development 
and sparsely-populated areas to designate other ‘c’ areas; and whether to designate areas 
justified on the basis of national arguments. Member States addressed these questions in a 
variety of ways reflecting national traditions in area designation, the flexibility allowed by 
the pre-eligibility criteria and the need for expedient and pragmatic solutions to complex 
and politically sensitive tasks. 
Figure 4.2 summarises the criteria under which the Commission approved the map proposals 
of the Member States for 2007-13. Where available, national assisted area maps are 
provided in an Annex to this report. Regarding the ‘c’ areas, two main points emerge. First, 
the EU criteria aside (low population density and economic development areas), the single 
most important basis for coverage is paragraph 30c – areas with a minimum population of 
100,000 with either GDP(PPS) below the EU average or unemployment 15 percent above the 
national average. In Austria, Denmark, France and the UK, these areas account for more 
than 50 percent of the assisted areas. Second, and related, Member States largely shunned 
the scope to designate assisted areas outside the Commission’s pre-eligibility criteria and 
select on the basis of nationally-justified criteria. There are two main options for 
designating areas which do not meet the pre-eligibility criteria: paragraph 30h enables 
areas with a minimum population of 50,000 “undergoing major structural change” to be 
designated as ‘c’ areas; paragraph 31 enables smaller areas (minimum population 20,000) 
to be targeted for SME support only.  
Seven countries used the structural change option (paragraph 30h) – Belgium, Germany, 
France, Spain, Italy, Finland, Sweden – but coverage is arguably significant only in France 
and Sweden where it accounts for around one-fifth or more of total coverage. Seven 
countries also opted for the micro-targeting of SME aid under paragraph 31: Belgium, 
Denmark, Germany, France, Ireland, Italy and Finland. In Denmark and Ireland these areas 
account for about a quarter of the assisted area total, but elsewhere coverage is not 
significant. 
One interesting point to note is that France opted to retain a population reserve for use as 
the need arose – for example in response to industrial restructuring. The criteria for the use 
of the reserve are tightly drawn at national level, in order to reduce political pressures for 
designation; the reserve has not been fully drawn down, with the agreement of the 
Commission to the amended maps. 
                                                 
53 Paragraphs 30(f) and (g). 
54 Paragraphs 30(h) and 31. 
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Figure 4.2: Assisted areas by type under the 2007-13 Guidelines (% of national population) 
 ‘a’ regions 
Stat 
effect 
Econ 
dev LPD CY/LU 
Pop 
100K NUTS 3 
Islands / 
isolated 
Islands 
<5k Border 
Struct 
chg. SMEs 
‘c’ 
areas TOTAL Res. Trans 
Para 15 18 30a 30b Note 32 30c 30d 30e 30f 30g 30h 31 30-31 
ex Res 
/Trans  95 
BE 0.0 12.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.97 1.2 1.5 13.5 25.7 0.0 0.0 
BU 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  100.0 0.0 0.0 
CZ 88.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  88.5 0.0 7.6 
DK 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.5 0.8 0.80 0.189 0.0 0.0 2.2 8.5 8.4 0.0 2.6 
DE 12.5 4.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.4 0.2 0.0 0.002 1.71 0.5 0.1 10.9 28.4 0.0 0.0 
EE 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  100.0 0.0 0.0 
GR 36.6 55.5 7.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.8 100.0 0.0 0.0 
ES 36.2 5.8 14.3 0.3 0.0 1.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.70 0.6 0.0 17.7 59.6 0.0 12.4 
FR 2.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.5 0.0 0.51 0.0 0.02 3.5 0.6 15.1 18.0 0.4 6.9 
IE 0.0 0.0 26.5 0.0 0.0 10.8 0.0 0.0 0.014 0.0 0.0 12.7 50.0 50.0 0.0 23.5 
IT 28.9 1.0 1.6   0.5  0.01  0.86 0.74 0.28 4.0 33.8  5.6 
CY 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  44.9 0.0 5.14 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 50.0 50.0 0.0 0.0 
LV 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  100.0 0.0 0.0 
LT 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  100.0 0.0 0.0 
LU     15.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 15.8 15.8 0.2 4.6 
HU 72.2 0.0 27.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 27.8 100.0 0.0 0.0 
MT 100.0             100.0   
NL      7.5       7.5 7.5  2.4 
AT 0.0 3.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 15.1 0.3 0.0 0.0 3.74 0.0 0.0 19.1 22.5 0.0 0.0 
PL 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  100.0 0.0 0.0 
PT 70.2 3.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.72 0.0 0.0 2.7 76.7 0.0 17.6 
RO 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  100.0 0.0 0.0 
SI 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  100.0 0.0 0.0 
FI 0.0 0.0 12.6 12.0 0.0 2.9 0.0 0.0 0.736 2.20 1.0 1.4 32.8 32.9 0.0 0.0 
SK 88.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  88.9 0.0 7.2 
SE 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.8 0.0 3.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.0 0.0 15.2 15.3 0.0 0.0 
UK 4.0 0.6 6.4 0.0 0.0 12.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.30 0.0 0.0 19.3 23.9 0.0 0.0 
IS 0.0 0.0 0.0 32.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 32.0 32.0 0.0 0.0 
LI              0.0   
NO    27.5         27.5 27.5 0.0 0.0 
EU27 32.1 3.2 3.3 0.3 0.01 5.5 0.05 0.08 0.010 0.66 0.78 0.31 11.0 46.3 0.04 3.5 
EU15 15.0 4.0 3.4 0.4 0.02 6.9 0.06 0.09 0.013 0.83 0.98 0.39 13.1 32.1 0.05 4.1 
NMS12 94.8  2.7   0.3  0.04     3.0 97.8  1.1 
EEA3    27.8         27.8 27.8   
Source: Own calculations from information in Commission decisions and Eurostat data. 
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4.3 National perspectives on the selection of eligible areas 
A recurrent theme in national perspectives on post-2013 reforms is the demand for more 
flexibility in the selection of assisted areas. In practice, area designation criteria are 
closely linked to spatial coverage: the higher the spatial coverage available, the less 
flexibility is needed; conversely, the lower the spatial coverage, the more flexibility in area 
designation becomes an imperative. This relates both to the ‘building blocks’ for area 
designation and the choice of indicators.  
Regarding building blocks, many regard the minimum population of 100,000 as too high – 
this is especially so in smaller Member States and those with relatively large NUTS 3 areas 
(which are therefore bound by the 100,000 principle). For some countries, the situation 
could become particularly acute if further cutbacks in coverage were imposed – for 
instance, the ‘rolling forward’ scenario described earlier could leave Denmark with an 
assisted area population of just over 400,000, the Netherland with around 600,000, Cyprus 
with fewer than 200,000 and Luxembourg with under 40,000. If these level were reached, it 
would be unrealistic (impossible in the case of Luxembourg) to devise a coherent map while 
adhering to the 100,000 population principle. An alternative proposal supported by a 
number of countries was that the minimum population blocks should be a proportion of the 
national population rather than an absolute sum. A further option proposed was that 
assisted areas should be built up from LAU2 – the smaller administrative level under the 
Eurostat definition – but it was not clear how a ‘scattergun’ or ‘leopard-skin’ approach to 
designation would be prevented under this approach. A related issue concerns the 
definition of ‘contiguity’. Some expressed the view that the concept lacked clarity and had 
not been applied consistently by the Commission. 
The choice of indicators was less of a source of contention than the question of building 
blocks. Some favour the ‘pre-eligibility’ approach of broadly limiting assisted areas to those 
where unemployment is over 115 percent of the national average or GDP(PPS) per head is 
lower than the EU average (paragraphs 30e, f and g – see above), and could support a 
tightening of these criteria if combined with more flexibility in building blocks. Others 
favoured more flexibility in the use of indicators and less emphasis on quantitative criteria. 
Looking forward, the ‘pre-eligibility’ criteria provide considerable scope for most Member 
States to select assisted areas, as Map 4.1 shows; on the other hand, for some countries, 
such as Denmark, the Netherlands, Germany (at least in the west) and Italy, there may be 
insufficient flexibility. This map illustrates the ‘a’ regions and the less densely-populated 
regions, together with the ‘pre-eligible’ ‘c’ areas; however, it excludes potential 
transitional areas - former ‘a’ areas and the sliding scale areas mentioned earlier. With two 
exceptions – the Romanian and Slovene NUTS 3 capital regions – all the potential 
transitional areas would qualify as ‘pre-eligible’ ‘c’ areas.  
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Map 4.1: ‘a’ regions, low population density and “pre-eligible” ‘c’ areas 2014+? 
'a' regions
"Pre-eligible" 'c' areas
Low population density
 
Source: Own calculations from Eurostat data. 
A specific point raised in relation to sparsely-populated regions is that the area to which 
population density relates should include inland waterways and lakes, not land only, the 
argument being that large areas of inland water tend to increase travel times and the need 
for transport aid. 
The provisions for designating areas for SME support only (paragraph 31) did not attract 
much comment. However, one interesting proposal is that these should fall outside the 
population quota which should apply to areas designated for aid to large firms. Several 
policymakers argued that the areas where there was potential for SME development did not 
necessarily coincide with those suitable for large firm investment; moreover, support for 
SMEs raises fewer competition concerns, justifying a more relaxed approach to assisted 
area coverage for this group. 
Several Member States argued that territorial cohesion should be explicitly recognised 
through continued special provision for low population density areas, external border areas 
and islands.  
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The need for scope to review assisted area maps is a prominent theme in Member States 
responses. In part this is because of the impact of the economic crisis and the fact that the 
data likely to be used (GDP for 2007-9) concerns a particularly volatile period. More 
generally, however, there is unease at the extent to which historical data sets the pattern 
of area designation for years to come. In addition, the fixing of a map for seven years, with 
limited scope for review impedes the use of regional aid as a means of rapid response to 
structural change in a region, arising, for instance, from major plant closures with severe 
localised impacts. Among the options proposed by the Member States are: the retention of 
a population reserve at the EU level which could be used as and when the need arose, but 
on the basis of specific criteria; the scope to designate areas for short periods in response 
to specific situations; the revision of assisted areas in 2016 when GDP data for 2009-11 is 
available; and two revisions of the ‘c’ areas, without limitation on the proportion of change 
(as noted above, at present, no more than 50 percent of the assisted areas may be 
changed).  
5. AID VALUES, ELIGIBILITY AND FORMS OF AID 
5.1 Aid values under RAG 2007-13 
The key principle underlying rates of award under RAG 2007-13 is that ‘aid intensity must 
be adapted to take account of the nature and intensity of regional aid problems that are 
being addressed.’55 In practice, the principal driver of award maxima is the level of GDP 
per head in relation to the EU average. Maximum award rates set out in RAG 2007-13 are 
summarised in Figure 5.1.  
Figure 5.1: Rates of award by firm size 2007-13 (percent gross grant equivalents) 
 Large Medium Small 
‘a’ areas < 45% EU25 GDP; OMR < 75% EU25 GDP 50 60 70 
‘a’ areas < 60% EU25 GDP 40 50 60 
‘a’ areas < 75% EU25 GDP; OMR > 75% EU25 GDP 30 40 50 
Statistical effect  30a → 20 40a → 30 50a → 40 
Low population density ‘c’ areas 15b 25b 35b 
Economic development ‘c’ areas 15b/10c 25b/20 35b/30 
Other ‘c’ areas 15b/10c 25b/20 35b/30 
Non-assisted 0 10 20 
Notes: a) Until 1 January 2011 when the rate fell as indicated for those areas that moved 
from ‘a’ to ‘c’ status. b) This may be raised in the case of areas adjacent to ‘a’ regions to 
ensure that the rate differential does not exceed 20 percentage points. c) The lower rate 
applies to eligible areas where GDP(PPS) per head is higher than the EU average and 
unemployment below the EU average measured at NUTS 3. Some further transitional 
arrangements apply to ‘a’ regions and economic development areas where the fall in award 
rates would otherwise be especially sharp. 
Source: Assembled from RAG 2007-13, paragraphs 44-48. 
These rates represent a significant lowering of award values in relation to the previous 
Guidelines (2000-6), which themselves had lowered maximum rates compared to those in 
the late 1990s.  
                                                 
55 RAG 2007-13, paragraph 42.  
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5.2 Forms of aid 
RAG 2007-13 refers to two types of aid – investment aid and operating aid. Most aid is so-
called investment aid, i.e. aid related to a particular project, rather than ongoing costs. 
However, operating aid is exceptionally authorised in the low population density areas and 
the outermost regions; there is also provision for operating aid in ‘a’ regions other than 
outermost regions. 
In terms of instruments the Guidelines are not restrictive and note that aid may take the 
form of ‘grants, low-interest loans or interest rebates, state guarantees, the purchase of a 
shareholding or an alternative provision of capital in favourable terms, exemptions or 
reductions in taxes, social security or other compulsory charges, or the supply of land, 
goods or services at favourable prices.’56 This reflects the Treaty provisions, which 
emphasise that aid may be in any form whatsoever. Nevertheless, the form of aid has 
implications for whether prior approval from the Commission is required, or whether the 
measure can simply be reported under the GBER. In order to fall within the scope of the 
GBER, aid schemes must, among other things, be ‘transparent’.57 In this context, 
transparency means regional investment aid schemes under which it is possible to calculate 
ex ante the gross grant equivalent (GGE) as a percentage of eligible expenditure. Such 
schemes include grants, interest rate subsidies and capped fiscal measures. Schemes which 
comprise a guarantee element may be considered transparent if the Commission has 
accepted the methodology used to calculate the intensity of the guarantee. Several 
countries58 have notified methodologies for calculating the grant-equivalent of measures. 
Clearly these measures do not involve expenditure per se, but instead seek the 
endorsement of a methodology that effectively renders aid transparent.59 This enables the 
Member State concerned to report schemes under the GBER that use the methodology to 
calculate aid values and increases the scope to include measures – notably guarantee 
schemes - that would otherwise lack the transparency for exemption. Repayable advances 
are transparent if the total advance does not exceed the aid ceiling expressed as a 
percentage of eligible expenditure. The following are explicitly not considered 
transparent:60 aid comprised in capital injections (without prejudice to the specific 
provisions on risk capital); and aid comprised in risk capital measures (except for risk 
capital aid schemes for SMEs that comply with the GBER). 
5.3 Eligible expenditure 
Eligible expenditure for investment aid includes land, buildings and plant/machinery. 
Except in the case of SMEs and takeovers, assets must be purchased new.61  
For large firms, the limit on intangible assets expenditure (technology transfers, patent 
acquisition, licences, know-how and unpatented technical knowledge) is set at 50 percent 
                                                 
56 RAG 2007-13, paragraph 37. 
57 GBER, Article 5(1). 
58 For example, France, Germany and Hungary. 
59 GBER, Article 5(1). 
60 GBER, Article 5(2). 
61 Paragraph 54. 
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of eligible expenditure.62 The Guidelines also set out a definition of initial investment.63 
This covers: 
 setting-up a new establishment 
 extending an existing establishment 
 diversifying the output of an establishment into new, additional products. 
 a fundamental change to the overall production process of an existing 
establishment. 
The Guidelines require aided assets to be retained for at least five years;64 however, it is 
made clear that this does not preclude the replacement of plant or equipment that has 
become outdated, provided that the economic activity is retained within the region 
concerned for the minimum period. 
Importantly, at least for countries where leasing is prevalent, leased assets can only be 
included in eligible expenditure if there is an obligation to purchase the assets at the end 
of the lease period. For land and buildings the lease must continue for at least five years 
after the anticipated completion of the project (three years in the case of SMEs).65 
Investment aid can be taken in the form a wage cost subsidy;66 the same rate of award 
applies as to initial investment. Eligible expenditure concerns the wage costs for a period of 
two years arising from job creation as a result of an initial investment project and refers to 
a net increase in jobs compared with the average over the preceding year. Jobs must be 
created within three years of the completion of the works concerned and the posts must be 
maintained in the region for at least five years.67 
The Commission regards operating aid as a form of assistance that can only be authorised 
in exceptional circumstances and only in ‘a’ regions, low population density regions and the 
outermost regions (OMR). Operating aid can generally only be offered in ‘a’ regions subject 
to the condition that: (i) it is justified in terms of its contribution to regional development; 
and (ii) its level is proportional to the handicaps it seeks to alleviate.68 It is for the Member 
States to demonstrate the existence of these handicaps and to measure their scale. It 
appears, however, that all the operating aid measures notified and approved to date have 
involved the special cases of the OMRs or the low/least populated regions. 
In principle, operating aid must be temporary and phased out over time. Operating aid 
which is not both progressively reduced and limited in time may only be authorised in the 
OMRs and the least-populated regions. In the Outermost Regions aid of up to 10 percent of 
                                                 
62 There is no limit for SMEs. 
63 Paragraphs 34-40. 
64 Member States may lower this to three years for SMEs. 
65 Paragraph 53. 
66 Paragraphs 57-59. 
67 Member States may reduce this to three years for SMEs. 
68 RAG 2006, paragraph 76. 
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the turnover of the beneficiary may be offered without the need for specific justification.69 
Aid above this level must be justified in terms of its contribution to regional development 
and set at a level to offset additional costs linked to their situation as OMRs.70 
Least-populated areas are defined as NUTS 2 regions (and adjacent and contiguous smaller 
areas) with a population density of eight inhabitants per km2 or less. It is for the Member 
State to demonstrate that aid is necessary to reduce or prevent depopulation. On this basis, 
the EFTA Surveillance Authority authorised a scheme of regionally-differentiated social 
security contributions in the least-populated regions.71 These areas cover around 17.7 
percent of the Norwegian population and have an average population density of 3.5 persons 
per km2. 
Aid partly to offset the additional costs of transport may be authorised in the OMRs and 
in the low population density regions. The criteria for transport aid are that:72 
 Aid may serve only to compensate for the additional cost of transport, taking account 
of other transport aid schemes. Aid may be calculated on a ‘representative basis’ but 
systematic overcompensation must be avoided. 
 Aid is restricted to the extra transport costs within national boundaries; it must not be 
allowed to become export aid. Aid is not available to sectors with no alternative 
locations (eg hydroelectric power, extractive industries). 
 Aid must be objectively-quantifiable in advance on the basis of an aid-per-passenger or 
aid-per-ton/kilometre ratio, and the subject of an annual report which sets out the 
operation of this ratio. 
 Estimates of additional cost must be based on the most economical form of transport 
and the shortest route between production or processing and commercial outlets using 
that form of transport; “external costs to the environment should also be taken into 
account”. 
 For the OMRs only, aid may cover the cost of transporting primary commodities, raw 
materials or intermediate products from the place of their production to the place of 
final processing in the region. 
                                                 
69 On this basis the Commission authorised reduced excise duty on locally-produced beer in Madeira - 
Case N 293/07. 
70 RAG 2007-13, footnote 74. The factors identified in the Treaty which may be offset by aid include 
remoteness, insularity, small size, difficult topography and climate and economic dependence on a 
few products. Thus in the Spanish notification of aid regimes for the Canary Islands, the authorities 
cited research which quantified the additional costs to businesses located in the Canaries compared 
to those in mainland Spain – see Cases N 377/2006 and N 376/2006. 
71 EFTA Surveillance Authority Decision of 19 July 2006 on the notified scheme concerning regionally 
differentiated social security contributions (Norway), 228/06/COL. 
72 RAG 2006, paragraph 81. 
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5.4 National perspectives on aid values, eligibility and forms of aid 
Historically, maximum rates of award have not been a major source of controversy in the 
operation of the Guidelines. For many countries, maximum rates were often set at levels 
higher than those at which national policymakers would opt to aid firms – prior to 2000, 
maximum rates in ‘a’ regions of 75 percent net grant-equivalent73 were widespread (though 
not necessarily widely used). RAG 2000-6 significantly reduced maximum rates; these were 
further reduced in RAG 2007-13, which, in addition, expressed rates in gross, rather than 
net terms, effectively lowering the maxima further. Reactions from the majority of the 
Member States suggest that, for the ‘c’ areas at least, rates of award may have reached 
their lowest acceptable levels. Several countries comment that lowering rates of award 
below 15 percent (some say 10 percent) would reduce the incentive effect of regional aid, 
potentially leading to higher windfall gains. However, there are differences of view on the 
appropriate aid differential – some argue that the maximum differential between ‘a’ 
regions and ‘c’ areas should be 15 percentage points, while others suggest it should be at 
least 20 percentage points. Moreover, while some appear content with the current rate 
banding and differentials, others argue that the whole matrix could be simplified. 
Nevertheless, there is general support for the retention of higher rates for SMEs although, 
as mentioned earlier, there is a suggestion that perhaps these should not be tied to the 
same assisted areas map as the availability of aid to large firms. 
Regarding eligibility¸ Member State comments concern a number of issues ranging from 
matters of principle to clarification across several aspects of eligibility. With respect to 
project type eligibility, some observed that the notion of an initial investment project 
was too restrictive a concept, while others suggested it required clarification. Several 
noted that the provisions on takeovers differ between RAG 2007-13 and the GBER and that 
the two should aligned and clarified. Also, it was argued that is should be possible for aid in 
the case of takeovers to be calculated on the basis of wage costs, not just investment, 
since job maintenance is typically the key public policy objective where the future of a firm 
may be at risk. Clarification was sought on what was meant by a fundamental change in the 
overall production process of an existing establishment and what expenditure associated 
with such a change could be treated as eligible for aid. Some questioned whether 
relocation from an assisted area in one country to an assisted area in another should be 
eligible for aid – or suggested that relocation from an ‘a’ region to another ‘c’ should be 
ineligible, or that only additional investment should be aided. Partly related (although it 
concerns greenfield investments as well as relocations) there was a proposal for some 
mechanism to prevent competitive outbidding between regions in the EU. On the other 
hand, it was also proposed that there should be provision for a ‘matching clause’, where an 
investment is being offered a higher rate in a non-EU location than is allowed under RAG 
2007-13, in order that a given project is not lost to the EU altogether. 
There were also some detailed points regarding eligible activities and expenditure. In 
particular: the provisions on sectors in overcapacity should be refined in order not to 
exclude specific products where there is no capacity problem; the relationship between the 
                                                 
73 In practice, these rates were even higher compared to current rates than they might appear since, 
at that time, rate were calculated in net (i.e. after tax) terms rather than gross, as at present. 
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rules on transport aid and aid to food processing, on the one hand, and regional aid, on the 
other, should be clarified to eliminate some of the anomalies that emerge at present; the 
rules on the purchase of new assets should be relaxed – it was argued that there may be 
sound reasons for assets being purchased second hand (for example, the specialised nature 
of some equipment). Moreover, in the case of buildings, in industrial closure areas it was 
usually far more beneficial for the area to encourage the purchase of existing premises 
rather support a new build. It was also argued that there should be better alignment of the 
rules on eligible expenditure and that, more generally, a clearer hierarchy of regulation 
should be developed with a view to achieving consistency between the various rules – RAG, 
GBER, Structural Funds regulations, EAGGF, and so on. 
With respect to aid instruments, a number of countries noted the apparent conflict of 
principle between Cohesion policy, which has heavily promoted the use of financial 
engineering instruments, and State aid control, which seems to conspire against their use. 
A number of Member States sought greater clarity on the requirements and an alignment of 
the Structural Fund and State aid rules in this regard before the start of the next 
programming period. Regarding leasing, some considered that the requirement to purchase 
at the end of the lease period was excessively onerous, while others argued that more 
clarity was needed to understand how leased assets could be aided. Some also considered 
that the provisions on the aid element in loans could be further clarified.  
On the specific issue of operating aid, it was argued by some that the same provisions on 
transport aid should apply to the low population density regions as to the Outermost regions 
– specifically that inbound as well as outbound transport should eligible for transport aid. In 
addition, it was suggested that the long experience with implementing aid for the low 
population density regions should mean that these provisions could now be incorporated 
into the GBER. Regarding the OMRs, there is strong support (among the affected countries) 
for the retention of existing provisions, but with scope for some technical adjustments (as 
yet undefined). 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
The aim of the paper has been to set the scene for the upcoming reform of the regional aid 
guidelines, following the expiry of the current rules at the end of 2013. The next set of 
guidelines will be the third generation of time-limited rules on regional aid – the first such 
guidelines having been introduced in 1998 (to cover 2000-6) following a history of more ad 
hoc approaches. The current guidelines (2007-13) built on the approach of previous 
guidelines, albeit with some important changes. Preparation of the next set of guidelines 
takes places in a very different economic and policy context: while the negotiation of RAG 
2000-6 was driven by the impact of enlargement to EU25, and the leitmotif of ‘less and 
better’ aid ran through the development of RAG 2007-13, current debates are dominated by 
the impact of the recession, both on regional economic development, and on the scope for 
public sector intervention in times of austerity, as well as on the impact of volatile GDP 
data on future assisted area coverage.  
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Notwithstanding the difficult economic context, early discussions about the reform of the 
regional aid guidelines have been constructive rather than combative. This is in stark 
contrast to the previous period when DG COMP’s starting point for reform was the proposal 
that regional aid should be restricted to the ‘a’ areas, the OMRs and low population density 
regions. This sparked an outcry from a number of Member States with the result that DG 
COMP rowed back from this stance to a position in RAG 2007-13 which was not so very 
different from RAG 2000-6. It was never entirely clear whether the initial announcement 
was more of a negotiating strategy than a real policy choice, but it certainly set the tone 
for the review. 
At the time of writing, however, the Commission has not made any formal proposals for the 
Guidelines post 2013; in principle, therefore, there is still scope for quite radical reform 
along the lines of that proposed in the previous period. In practice, though, evolution 
rather than revolution seems the more likely outcome. This partly owes to the maturity of 
the existing system: many of the principles underpinning the current approach are rooted in 
policies adopted in the 1970s which have been progressively refined; in addition, the 
introduction of the block exemption regulations have brought a degree of order and 
proportionality to the scrutiny of regional aid measures. In consequence, many of the issues 
highlighted by national policymakers are concerned with clarification of technical points 
and/or harmonisation of approaches under the GBER and the RAG. Notwithstanding this, 
there are several areas of tension where either inaction or tightening of conditions is likely 
to be resisted by the Member States.  
One such issue concerns so-called financial engineering or new financial instruments. In 
reality, such instruments – essentially ‘non-grant’ financial incentives - have a long history 
in many Member States, but the new terminology reflects increased impetus given to such 
measures at the European level, notably through initiatives such as JEREMIE and JESSICA. 
Such measures take a variety of forms, notably loans, guarantees and various forms of 
equity, or a combination of instruments, which have the common characteristic of being 
repayable. Accordingly their attraction lies partly in their perceived financial sustainability 
in times of austerity – since the sums advanced are repaid and can be ‘recycled’ to support 
other firms - and partly in their capacity to leverage-in private sector capital thus 
expanding the pool of resources available for entrepreneurial finance. In practice, however, 
the approval of financial engineering measures for State aid purposes has typically proven 
to be a lengthy and uncertain process, entailing significant delays in implementation. In 
consequence, many regard the clarification of the State aid treatment of such measures in 
advance of the next Structural Funds planning period to be an imperative in the reform of 
the regional guidelines post 2013. 
A further issue concerns incentive effect. The notion of incentive effect has been given 
increasing prominence since the State aid action plan. In RAG 2007-13 incentive effect is 
achieved simply by dint of applying for aid prior to project start; in the GBER, more 
stringent conditions are applied in respect of large firms; and, for very large projects where 
aid proposals are subject to close scrutiny, the Commission assessment includes a “detailed 
verification that the aid is necessary to provide an incentive effect”. At the level of the 
Member States there is, of course, considerable interest in ensuring that regional aid does 
have an incentive effect and does not simply result in windfall gains. However, there is 
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widespread (though not universal) scepticism that incentive effect can be assessed 
effectively. As such, there is likely to be considerable resistance to any proposals to 
reinforce the existing requirements to demonstrate incentive effect in the GBER.  
The question of rates of award is partly related to incentive effect. As noted in this paper, 
historically, maximum rates of aid have not been controversial and have often exceeded 
levels at which national policymakers wanted to aid firms. RAG 2007-13 and its predecessor 
significantly reduced award maxima compared to the past, but there is now a widespread 
sense that rates, in the ‘c’ areas at least, should go no lower. There is some debate about 
what the appropriate ‘minimum ceiling’ should be – 10 percent or 15 percent – but many 
policymakers consider that below these levels incentive effect is eroded and windfall gains 
are increased. It is important to recall here that the rules on aid to large projects 
dramatically reduce award maxima, so that impact for more substantial investment may be 
exacerbated. 
The major unknown at the present time concerns spatial coverage. It is anticipated, but 
not confirmed, that the Commission will proceed on the basis of an overall population 
ceiling, with certain regions earmarked for coverage within that ceiling and the remaining 
population distributed on some basis yet to be decided. Apart from the lack information 
about DG COMP’s thinking, future perspectives are complicated by two further factors: the 
volatility of the GDP data over what is likely to be the reference period for determining 
coverage (2007-9); and the modalities, if any, for taking account of Cohesion policy 
proposals for 2014+, especially with respect to the treatment of transitional areas. A 
number of scenarios and variants based on the current approach can be envisaged, but 
these have very different impacts between countries. Member States are generally opposed 
to further cutbacks in overall coverage, which are anyway not required to stay below a 
ceiling of 50 percent of EU27 population. However, there are divergent views on issues such 
as the definition of ‘a’ regions, the treatment of transitional regions and the need for a 
‘safety net’ to ensure a minimum level of coverage for each Member State; this last point is 
likely to be key for some Member States which, on a simple rolling forward approach, might 
be set to have coverage halved a second time. 
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ANNEX: NATIONAL ASSISTED AREA MAPS 2007-13 
Note: national assisted area maps are not available for the following countries: Estonia, 
Hungary, Ireland Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Romania, Slovenia and Slovakia. For all of these 
countries apart from Ireland and Slovakia, the assisted areas cover the entire territory of 
the country. 
AUSTRIA 
 
Source: OROK 
BELGIUM: FLANDERS 
 
Source: Administration of the Flanders region. 
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NB. Tubize : éligible jusqu ’au 31/12/2010
Ministère de la Région Wallonne
Direction de la Politique Economique  
Source: Région Wallonne, Direction de la Politique Economique (DPE) 
BULGARIA 
 
Source: Bulgarian administration. 
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CYPRUS 
 
Legend: pink = eligible area 2007-13; white = non-eligible area; green = eligible areas for 
2007/08; light pink = occupied area; red line = location of Turkish occupation forces; green 
dashes = British military base; blue dots = location of communities with inhabitants 
Source: Department of Land and Survey, Cartography branch, Section of Digital 
Cartography and GIS, 27.11.2006. 
CZECH REPUBLIC 
 
Source: Ministry of Finance. 
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DENMARK 
 
Source: Indenrigs- og Sundhedsministeriet (2007), Regionalpolitisk redegørelse 2007 - 
Analyser og baggrund. København, Indenrigs- og Sundhedsministeriet. 
European Policy Research Paper No. 80  European Policies Research Centre 49
Recent developments in competition policy and regional aid 
FINLAND 
 
Source: Ministry of Employment and the Economy, available at: 
http://www.intermin.fi/intermin/images.nsf/files/d8938d7e67d62ddac225728200397db4/$
file/tukialuekartta_25012007.pdf 
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FRANCE 
 
Source: DATAR. 
European Policy Research Paper No. 80  European Policies Research Centre 51
Recent developments in competition policy and regional aid 
GERMANY 
 
Source: Federal Ministry of Economy and Science, available at: 
http://www.bmwi.de/BMWi/Redaktion/PDF/foerdergebietskarte-ab-
2007,property=pdf,bereich=bmwi,sprache=de,rwb=true.pdf 
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GREECE 
 
Category 1 Category 2  
Zones  Grants, leasing aid, 
labour subsidies  
Tax exemption  Grants, leasing aid, 
labour subsidies  
Tax exemption  
A  20%  60%  15%  50%  
B  30%  100%  25%  100%  
C  40%  100%  35%  100%  
Note: Category 1 refers to investment plans that involve tourism, environment, high 
technology, production of electricity from renewable natural resources, broadband 
infrastructures and innovative digital services, amongst others; Category 2 includes 
investment in agricultural, fishery, mining and certain tourism activities. 
Source: Greek government 
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ITALY 
 
Areas covered by 87.3(a): statistical effect 
Areas covered by 87.3(a): statistical effect until 31.12.2010 
Areas covered by 87.3(a): until 31.12.2013 
Areas covered by 87.3(c): whole municipality 
Areas covered by 87.3(a): census areas (part of municipality) 
Source: Ministry of Economy and Finance, Department for Development Policies. 
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LUXEMBOURG 
 
Source: State aid No. N 523/2006 - Luxembourg, Regional aid map 1.1.2007-31.12.2013, OJ 
C/280/2006. 
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THE NETHERLANDS: NORTH 
 
THE NETHERLANDS: LIMBURG 
 
Source: Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs 
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NORWAY: REGIONAL AID AND SOCIAL SECURITY CONCESSION 
 
 
Source: Ministry of Local Government and Regional Development 
 
POLAND 
 
Source: http://www.paiz.gov.pl/nowosci/?id_news=1256 
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PORTUGAL 
 
Source: Portuguese government. 
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SPAIN 
 
Source: Ministry of Economy and Finance (www.meh.es). 
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SWEDEN 
 
Source: Swedish Agency for Economic and Regional Growth (Tillväxtverket), available at 
http://www.tillvaxtverket.se/download/18.2951bcb412700b68b8680002824/Karta+St%C3%B
6domr%C3%A5de+A+och+B.pdf 
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SWEDEN: TRANSPORT AID 
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UNITED KINGDOM: GREAT BRITAIN 
 
NOTE: Northern Ireland is eligible in its entirety. 
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